753.94/9–1444: Telegram
The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:02 p.m.]
2870. ReEmbs 2808, September 8, 9 p.m.11 At the outset of my conversation with Salazar yesterday I inquired concerning the accuracy of the report we had received that the Japanese had offered to withdraw from Timor. Salazar stated that about two weeks ago he had called the Japanese Minister in and told him that something had to be done about Timor. The matter had now been dragging on for some years and this could not be tolerated any longer. He would next be compelled to turn to the British and Americans, in order to have a Portuguese force sent to drive the Japanese out.
At this point the Japanese Minister inquired whether Salazar had yet approached the Allies. When Salazar replied in the negative the Japanese Minister said that the question was a very difficult one. Tokyo was considering it. Last week in a further interview with the Japanese Minister the latter again inquired whether Salazar had approached us on this subject. Salazar was still able to reply that he had done nothing of a concrete nature but added that with the impending collapse of Germany the entire forces of the Allies would soon be turned upon Japan and that if the Japanese wished to withdraw gracefully from Timor now was the time to do so. The Japanese Minister refused to commit himself and Salazar believes that in actual fact the Japanese will not leave Timor, if for no other reason than because of the “loss of face” they would suffer if they as a great power acceded to [Page 66] this request under pressure from small Portugal. During these discussions Salazar also told the Japanese Minister that he wanted something done about regularizing the situation at Macao.
The Japanese Minister remarked that Tokyo had certain reservations in this entire matter since, even if they did withdraw from Timor, might not the Portuguese at some later date turn against Japan, permitting the use of Timor as a base of operations.
At this point I mentioned the Quebec Conference12 which is largely concerned with Far Eastern matters and referred to the important British and American Army, Navy and Air Force officers who had left their other urgent tasks to come to Lisbon to engage in staff talks on the subject of Timor. Had his conversations with the Japanese Minister affected his wish that these talks be held and did he still want them? He replied emphatically that he did stating that the talks could begin this week.
Salazar understood the talks would be technical in character but that undoubtedly various political aspects would crop up at the same time. These could be dealt with simultaneously by him in conjunction with the British Ambassador and myself. He expressed his hope that as a result of the staff conferences he would be able to reach a decision respecting Timor and the immediate future of Portuguese interests in the Far East. I then said that this was all very well but then what would his position be vis-à-vis Japan. He would have the basis for a technical arrangement with us and his diplomatic channel with the Japanese would still be open. He admitted this but said again that he did not think the Japanese would leave Timor not denying however that he was playing both ends against the middle.
Salazar remarked that we wanted him to break with Japan. If a decision to use force in Timor were reached as a result of the staff talks a break would naturally follow. He must think however by [of] the position of the Portuguese in Macao in such case. The war in the Pacific might go on for 2 years. I replied that while we would evidently like to see him break with the Japanese the decision was his and he must make it. Meanwhile the delegation for the staff talks was here at his own request.
He then alluded to the importance we attach to Santa Maria which represented, we had said, the greatest contribution he could make to the war in the Far East. I reconfirmed this, emphasizing its importance, even though indirect so far as Portugal was concerned, in the freeing of China, the Philippines and other areas from the Japanese yoke. In this immediate connection and in reply to my query [Page 67] about the status of Serrano’s request for authority for additional land expropriation urgently needed to advance the construction, Salazar expressed recognition of the urgency of the Santa Maria question and remarked that he had never held up any request which had reached him about the project since the work started as well as that no request was now pending with the Ministry of War. He observed that a large shipment of supplies was expected to arrive within a few days and said, in passing, that the British had requested permission to maintain a patrol in the area for the next several weeks in order to safeguard arrival and unloading. I said I understood some misunderstanding had arisen over land expropriation.
Repeating that no request from Serrano for further authorization was now pending Salazar again inquired why he had not received the Pan-Air tender yet and why some of our experts had gone back to Washington from Santa Maria. I was able to reply that they had now returned to the Island and went on to say that now was the time to settle the global project and that I hoped this could be done before the Quebec talks ended, every day being of vital importance. He then admitted that he was tired of successive requests for authorization which had to be dealt with piecemeal.
Could we not try some other approach on the basis of which a more satisfactory arrangement could be worked out? After some discussion it was agreed that we should submit to him the master plan for the whole project (ReDeptel 2315 August 23, 7 p.m.13) in detail with a covering explanatory memorandum. He would study this, seeking a new approach, and then we would endeavor to reduce to waiting the formula covering the conditions of use, et cetera. He mentioned the necessity for a clause providing for the return of the field to Portugal after the war.
He went on to point out that he was not necessarily interested in anything so big as we envisaged and that some provision would have to be made for adjustment after the war on buildings, et cetera, which would not then be needed. He said that he expected Lagens to be the principal field in peace time since it lay in a populated area whereas Santa Maria, even [though] the weather conditions there were better, was barren. Santa Maria field would be a necessary adjust [adjunt?] of Lagens as he sees it after the war, for emergency use mainly. I remarked here that the same competent American labor and first-class material was putting in a first-class airport at Santa Maria as had been the case at Lagens.
It is my belief that Salazar is now disposed to see the global Santa Maria project on an urgent basis and that his willingness to seek now a “new approach” to the problem represents a distinct step forward. [Page 68] I feel also that my reaffirmation of Santa Maria as a bilateral question only has carried weight with Salazar. We plan to send him the detailed master plan today.