811.34553B/7–2444
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)
The Portuguese Ambassador2 called this morning at his request to discuss recent developments in connection with the desires of our Air Corps for the immediate construction and future wartime operation of an airfield on Santa Maria in the Azores. The Ambassador reviewed past developments at some length as he saw them and emphasized that he was talking to me on his own initiative and not upon instructions from his government. His principal motif was a plea that we would not insist upon a definite commitment from Salazar at this time that the field be turned over to us for operation. He said that it was his understanding, and likewise Salazar’s and Sampaio’s, all during the previous discussions that the principal point was the construction of the airfield and that we would be willing to let the question of its use ride until construction is completed, thus taking into consideration Salazar’s “difficult legal problem” of neutrality. He referred to Macao and what the Japanese might do there if premature action were taken now. Salazar was accordingly much surprised and somewhat embarrassed, he said, suddenly to receive a letter from Norweb around the 13th or 14th of July3 asking for a specific commitment with regard to the future use of the field, as well as for immediate authorization for construction, with an indication that a reply must be forthcoming within three or four days. Apparently this letter and the time limit, said Bianchi, somewhat offended Portuguese sensibilities. He further complained that Colonel Solborg, our Military Attaché, apparently had knowledge of the letter and was openly talking around Lisbon to the effect that we were going to insist on immediate action and that this public discussion had likewise created an unfortunate impression.
The Ambassador then referred to the President’s message carried by Mr. Culbertson and said that he believed that in the light of Mr. Norweb’s interview with Dr. Salazar on July 20th the situation had progressed in reality beyond that at the time the President had sent his message. He explained in some detail the Portuguese need for Pan American Cover and said that all that remains to begin construction of the field is a firm offer from Pan American to undertake the construction and a definite estimate of the cost. I told the Ambassador that I felt confident the latter would be forthcoming today and that we had been in touch with Pan American in this regard.
[Page 60]In replying to Dr. de Bianchi, I told him that any correspondence with regard to Ambassador Norweb’s letter to which he referred must have taken place during my recent absence on leave and that I could not discuss that aspect of the question without looking into the records. As to the question of operation of the airfield, I said that we wished to make it clear beyond all doubt that our interest in the airfield certainly did not terminate with its construction and that we would quite naturally expect to operate it in the prosecution of the war, particularly against Japan. I added that in view of the Portuguese interest in Timor and Macao I felt that his government should have an equal desire to see this war brought to an early and successful conclusion. He said that he felt we could have full confidence in Dr. Salazar’s ultimate intentions and should take into consideration his present embarrassment and need to refrain from making any commitment as to the use of the airfield at this time. He then added that of course in the last analysis we could always fall back on the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and the agreement made thereunder. I said with some emphasis that this would not be satisfactory; that our military authorities would insist upon operating the field directly. He hastened to say that he did not anticipate any such suggestion on Dr. Salazar’s part, but merely desired to point out the ultimate safeguard which we would have. I reiterated that use of the field under the British agreement would not be satisfactory.
(I did not wish to press with greater insistence at this time the question of a commitment at this time for the operation of the airfield upon completion: To do so might merely delay the authorization for construction and in view of the time and weather features it seems preferable not to endanger that authorization by injecting the other issue. Salazar must know that in practice if we build the field, it would be very difficult to prevent our operation of it, though he may be counting on some British support in this respect.)