740.00112 European War 1939/12–1844
The Counselor of the British Embassy (Marris) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)
Dear Mr. Acheson: You will remember that the Swedish Government have undertaken to impose a total embargo on exports to Germany immediately the Saturnus, now at sea, reaches Gothenburg.
We are now informed by the Ministry of Economic Warfare in London that the Swedes have recently been inclined to believe that, in order not to have to admit a rupture of commercial relations with Sweden, the Germans would allow the Gothenburg traffic to continue so long as the Swedes continued to make token shipments to Germany. M. Boheman has now informed the Ministry that the Germans have recently intimated to the Swedish Government that there would be some hope of maintaining the Gothenburg traffic if discussions about Swedish exports could take place in the middle of January, and if there were no actual embargo on January 1st. According to the Ministry, Boheman interprets this to mean that the Gothenburg traffic will definitely be stopped unless some exports from Sweden continue after January 1st.
We are accordingly instructed to enquire urgently from the Department and F.E.A. whether the latter would agree to the Swedes discussing with the Germans the question of continuing a very small volume of trade in timber and wood products, in return for the maintenance of the Gothenburg traffic.
The Ministry instruct us to remind the Department and F.E.A. that maintenance of the Gothenburg traffic has certain definite advantages to the Allies. In the first place, American and British interests will be prejudiced if 100 octane gasoline cannot be supplied in Sweden for maintaining air communications between Sweden and the United Kingdom, and in this connection, arrangements are now being made to load 100 octane gasoline on a Swedish tanker which cannot however reach Gothenburg until shortly after January 1st. Furthermore, [Page 680] relief operations in liberated Norway, and possibly even in occupied Norway, will need to be undertaken on a large scale, and will certainly be hampered if Sweden can no longer import from overseas. Finally, if Sweden is cut off from all overseas trade for a period of several months, her capacity to contribute to the reconstruction of Europe will necessarily be impaired.
The Ministry ask us to emphasize that they are not agreeing, or asking the Department and F.E.A. to agree, to any actual arrangement between the Swedes and the Germans. It will always be possible to turn down any concrete proposal if we do not like it, and to insist on a complete embargo of Swedish exports to the enemy. All that is now proposed is that we should authorise the Swedes to discover on what terms the Gothenburg traffic might be kept open.
As time is short, I would be grateful if you could let me have, at your early convenience, the views of the Department and F.E.A. to communicate to the Ministry of Economic Warfare in London.
Yours sincerely,