740.00112 European War 1939/10–1744: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)
2098. 1. Department and FEA have no objection to the inclusion of the products mentioned in Mr. Winant’s 8877, October 17, 9 p.m. to the Department (London’s 581, October 17 to you)94 in the informal démarche you and Mr. Mallet are to make to Mr. Günther. You are accordingly requested to call upon the Foreign Minister as soon as an appointment can be arranged and make oral representations along the lines indicated in the Department’s 1999, October 5,95 as modified by its 2039 October 11,96 and with mention of our gratification at the encouragement given by the Swedish Government to SKF in its decision to stop exports of bearings and bearing machinery. You should add that we naturally do not wish to indicate the measures that may be taken by Sweden in order to meet us on these points. The important thing is that the shipments to Germany of the products listed in the aforementioned telegrams cease, whether by Government decree, decision of the producers, et cetera.
2. For your confidential information, the War and Navy Departments (including the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff), the State Department and the FEA consider our ultimate aim with respect to [Page 650] Swedish-German trade is the total cessation of all Swedish exports to Germany. This decision has been reached after careful consideration by our highest military and naval authorities of the possible adverse effects of such action upon the military and related factors you have mentioned. However, as the British apparently do not yet see eye-to-eye with us on this matter and as we consider that a joint approach will be far more effective than a unilateral one, we are willing to limit our present démarche to a request for the termination of the exportation of Swedish products most important to the German war effort. This concession on our part does not, of course, preclude a further approach on the cessation of all trade, either by us alone or with British concurrence which we will continue to endeavor to obtain.
3. For your further confidential information, the Department appreciates the humanitarian desires of the Swedish Government to utilize its remaining trade as a weapon to force the Germans to terminate the deportation to Germany of Danish and Norwegian hostages (your 4213, October 16, 8 p.m.98). We are doubtful, however, that much could be accomplished at this late date to alleviate the suffering of the Danes and Norwegians by employing this threat and, in addition, feel that in the final analysis military consideration must be decisive.
4. We fully concur in your view that your hand would be greatly strengthened if more favorable treatment were extended to Swedish requests for permission to acquire products essential to Sweden’s economy (your 4166, October 13, 7 p.m.98). Steps have already been taken to meet certain of the Swedish requests on asbestos packings and sheetings as well as supplies needed by SKF. Efforts are being made to settle the toluol question although the supply situation is extremely tight and the total amount involved could not be approved in full prior to the first quarter of 1945. Certain other Swedish requirements, notably buna and lead, could not in any case be granted until a satisfactory solution of the current economic warfare problems is reached. Bunker stocks at Göteborg and 100-octane gasoline will have to receive approval of our military authorities. Swedish compliance with the requests contained in the present démarche would naturally create a much more favorable atmosphere for such approval. In your discretion, you may so indicate to our friends in the Swedish Government.
5. Please inform us when the démarche has been made.
Repeated to London as Department’s 8659.