740.00112 European War 1939/9–2844: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)82
7927. Department’s 7811, September 26, 10 a.m.83 After due reflection on the implications of the action of the Swedish Government [Page 641] in closing Swedish ports on the Baltic to all non-Swedish vessels, it is our opinion that although this step goes a long way toward meeting our objective respecting the total elimination of Swedish-German trade, several important “leaks” still exist. Iron ore is still being exported by rail to Narvik and German Vessels may still load at Goteborg and Malmo products regularly exported through these ports such as ball bearings and special steels. In view of these circumstances, and the fact that our agreement with SKF expires October 12, the Department considers that it would be desirable for the American and British Ministers at Stockholm jointly to approach the Swedish Foreign Minister in the near future and make oral representations in the following sense.
They should inform Mr. Günther that the American and British Governments have noted with satisfaction the decision of the Swedish Government to close the Baltic ports to German shipping. The two Governments regret, however, that the ports of Malmö and Goteborg are still open to German vessels and hence products essential to the German war effort such as ball bearings and special steels may still be obtained by the Germans. In addition, they consider it most unfortunate that Germany may still secure iron ore by rail shipments to Narvik. Considering these facts, the American and British Governments strongly urge that the Swedish Government take such measures as it may deem necessary to close the ports of Goteborg and Malmo to German shipping, terminate completely ore shipments via Narvik and limit exports via the Hälsinborg–Helsingor ferry to small hand parcels. They should add that action along these lines would redound to Sweden’s advantage in Allied eyes, indicating as it would the desire of Sweden to prevent by every means in its power the prolongation of the war in Europe. Furthermore, to offset the hardship occasioned to Sweden through its inability to acquire German products, the American and British Governments would, in the event of a favorable reply, give sympathetic consideration to Sweden’s essential needs insofar as the supply situation permits.
Our Ministers should also impress upon Mr. Günther that, before giving a negative reply, the Swedish Government should give every consideration to the fact that for a considerable period after the collapse of Germany, Sweden will be dependent upon Allied consent for imports from sources under our control, including Germany and to the possibility that it might be necessary to take direct action against the Swedish companies engaged in exporting goods to Germany.
Please discuss the above proposal with the British at once and telegraph urgently whether they are in agreement with us. If the British agree, the Soviet Government will then be informed through the [Page 642] British and American Ambassadors at Moscow and invited to lend its support to the joint Anglo-American démarche.