811.34553B/7–1344: Telegram

The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

2162. We have read and digested contents of Department’s 1958, July 11, which we now [not?] only fully appreciate but with which we are in agreement as to substance and feeling. It may have been difficult for us to convey in telegrams with what urgency and stress we are viewing developments but on other hand at no time do we feel we have given grounds for the note of discouragement such as seems to color Department’s 1941, July 8 and 1951, July 10.

On contrary although we are far from satisfied and are driven almost to point of exasperation by tempo of developments they are not abnormal from Portuguese point of view. For the past weeks the movement has been definitely progressive and in the week since [Page 49] survey was completed and given to Salazar we have had further indications that matter is moving forward in all its aspects. In dealing with the Prime Minister one has to learn to read the signs and interpret the language endeavoring to draw correct conclusions therefrom. At this point we do not doubt eventual attainment of our long range objectives since we are confident that he himself not only is attracted by the prospect of a first class trans-Atlantic airfield for Portugal but also has in mind a contribution which will redound to Portugal’s advantage in the Far East.

He is wise and farsighted and at the same time a prudent man and there is evidence that he is considering every angle on this project including Portuguese neutrality in Europe even to the point of consulting with Spain as he did prior to the British Azores Agreement.

I saw Sampaio again yesterday who assured me that Salazar was giving his attention to our Azores [sic] and that as soon as his mind was made up he would receive me. I said I was sure this was the case but repeated that I was deeply disturbed at the time factor. Undoubtedly some element unknown to us is incomplete the picture as Salazar sees it and this would explain his delay in calling me. We know for instance that 2 days ago he convoked the top military officials to discuss the plan with them. Only yesterday General Lelloone of the inner circle spoke to me with evident enthusiasm of the project for fine installation at Santa Maria.

We are of course facing certain risks but these in our judgment do not include backsliding on part of Salazar. Moreover the chain of events during last fortnight strengthens this belief. Our main concern is lest he sacrifice this unique opportunity by his constitutional in Cape City [incapacity] to move fast.

Norweb