740.00112 European War 1939/9–544
Oral Remarks by the American Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Günther)65
We feel confident that the Swedish Government, in its own interest as well as in that of humanity, has wished to assist in ending the war. Sweden has given practical demonstrations of this desire. Since 1943 the assistance which our enemies have been able to derive from Sweden has been materially reduced. We fully recognize in this connection the importance of the action of the Swedish Government in stopping Swedish shipping engaged in trade with the enemy.
Until recently, however, it has appeared that the military situation has been such that the Swedish Government, while disposed to take steps in the name of Swedish interests with respect to Germany which would also be of benefit to the Allied cause, has taken these steps in a spirit of caution, subsequent to certain political and military developments. It has been recognized that the Swedish Government could not for reasons of national security consider going much further in making a positive contribution to shortening the war. It has now, [Page 628] however, become obvious, as a result of the rapid change in the military situation, that Sweden can take steps which would have a decisive effect upon political and military developments and would hasten the termination of hostilities.
It is urged that Sweden take this action rather than pursue a policy which, although possibly consistent with Sweden’s short-term interest, cannot be the basis for a Swedish claim to the position to which she might otherwise be entitled after this war shall have been won through the sacrifice of Allied blood and treasure without a substantial contribution to such victory having been made by the Swedish Government. The withdrawal of insurance coverage and consequent halting of Swedish shipping proceeding to German ports is an encouraging forecast of a possible change in Swedish policy, which we hope will be accomplished before the continuing successes of our Armed Forces have made Swedish action unnecessary. The progress of the invasions of France points to the rapidity with which the time is slipping by during which Sweden can take steps which will have a decisive effect upon political and military developments and ultimately upon the outcome of the war itself.
It has been said that Sweden has had to exercise caution in taking steps which might compromise her position of neutrality, because of the possible effect of such a precedent on Sweden’s position in the next war. The Allies are bending every effort to crush such peace breakers as Germany and Japan and, upon their defeat, to assist in bringing about the creation of an international security organization without which there could be little hope for peace in the future. It would be wishful thinking to suppose that the development of modern means of warfare would permit any nation in the future to remain neutral should some powerful aggressor nation arise and set out to dominate the world.
That the war will soon be won by the United Nations has become obvious as a result of the rapid change in the military situation. Many thoughtful persons are speculating as to what will be the lot of Sweden in the early postwar period. Some hope that what Sweden has to offer in the way of transportation and production facilities will be so much in demand that Sweden will necessarily receive equal treatment in the postwar period with the several members of the United Nations. Others, however, are not so optimistic. It is anticipated by them that Allied agencies will control the distribution of all important raw materials, food and fuel. They contemplate that if Sweden should be cut off from its present European sources of supply, which they realize may happen even before the end of the [Page 629] war, and the Allied supply agencies failed to make provision for Swedish requirements in the allocations, Sweden would face a painful deterioration of its economy which might carry over well into the postwar period.
It should be evident that if Sweden’s action now does not induce the Allied supply agencies to take Sweden’s import needs of important raw materials, food and fuel sympathetically into account when allocations of those goods are made, the Swedish Government can hardly expect those agencies will be inclined to give much consideration to Sweden’s needs in the immediate postwar period.
Allied agencies have had long experience in allocating goods in short supply. It is not likely, in view of the many advantages to both producers and consumers from this type of control, that this administrative machinery will be discontinued immediately after the war. Indeed it is anticipated that as the Allies enlarge their area of control it will become increasingly advisable, in view of the desirability of obviating postwar economic disturbances in so far as practicable, to retain machinery for planned international trade. It seems apparent that a system of priorities will have to be used and as a practical matter it is almost inevitable that any country’s claim to materials in short supply will be considered in the light of its action during the war.
The practical demonstrations which hitherto Sweden has given of its desire to cooperate with the Allies have entailed sacrifices and risk. It is now believed that the time has come when Sweden can, without endangering national security, go much further. Whatever the resulting sacrifices may be, they can only be of short duration, and whatever the risk, it would be so slight as to be almost non-existent. On the other hand, the rewards for Sweden, both political and economic, would be substantial.
- Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 4034, September 5, from Stockholm; received September 13.↩