740.00112 European War 1939/8–2144: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)
1680. Your 3212, 3216, 3217 and 321855 have been received and your action in insisting that démarche be made not later than August 23 is fully approved.
It must be reiterated that we attach the greatest importance to placing the joint message and supplementary oral remarks on the record at once. It is entirely possible that even should Sweden forthwith respond by terminating all trade with the enemy, such action will not at this late date have a determining effect upon shortening the war by depriving Germany of valuable imports. But in any case, the promptness and decisiveness of the Swedish response will make manifest to the whole world where Sweden stands with respect to the fundamental issues involved in this war—it will be that standing up to be counted in this war to which we referred in one of our earlier telegrams. Sweden has given us certain indications of her “inward and spiritual grace” but what is required at this time is “the outward and visible sign”.
We feel that certain of Boheman’s observations as reported in your 3216 call for comment: Far from attempting to bully Sweden into action, the purpose of our proposed formal démarche is to make American, British and Soviet views entirely clear to the Swedish Government in order that it may have an opportunity to take action on [Page 623] its own initiative. With respect to Boheman’s statement that in the case of the Dicto and Lionel we made use of Sweden’s neutral duties but are now practically asking Sweden to abandon neutrality, his attention might be drawn to the Swedish Prime Minister’s speech of July 23 in which he said, in effect, that Sweden’s policy had not been one of strict legal neutrality but a policy of expediency, first yielding concessions to one side and then to the other side, in order to keep Sweden out of the war. His reference to the fact that Sweden would be despised later if it should abandon neutrality at this stage of the war at once suggests that he has in mind the possible future attitude of Germany. If this assumption is correct, it would indicate shortsighted thinking on Boheman’s part: (1) the United Nations would certainly not despise nor forget any Swedish action which would shorten the war and save Allied lives; and (2) after Germany’s defeat all Germany’s political and commercial relations will be directed in accordance with the wishes of such Allied control authority as is established in Germany.
Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London as No. 6687 of Aug. 22 and to Moscow as No. 2005 of Aug. 22.
- Telegrams 3212 and 3218 not printed.↩