740.00112 European War 1939/8–1144: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:28 p.m.]
3056. This afternoon Boheman advised me he had instructed Hägglöf yesterday to advise Foot and Riefler that Swedish Insurance [Page 606] Board has decided to refuse insurance to any Swedish shipping to any North Sea German port. Boheman explained that roughly 55% of Swedish iron ore exports to Germany are carried on Swedish ships. As vast majority of this traffic must be unloaded at North Sea ports Boheman estimates action of Board will result in immediate curtailment of about 40% of total iron ore shipments to Germany. This measure of refusing insurance is in fact a Government act and Boheman informs me Board itself acting on business basis had stated that there was no necessity for the action, that existing circumstances would only require them to raise insurance rate. The measure is not applicable to ships already loaded and at sea en route to destination which cannot be recalled. It has not yet been made applicable to Baltic ports and Swedish shipping has not yet been stopped from going to Baltic ports with exception of Danzig. Boheman’s statement to me the other day (see my 2965 August 5, 10 p.m.) that Stettin had been included is a mistake. As soon as Swedish Government has information that Russian submarines can operate in Baltic they will stop Swedish shipping to Baltic ports.
I thanked Boheman for the information and asked him informally if it were not true that great majority of Swedish ships in trans-Baltic traffic are coal burners and old vessels. He said it was true and explained importance to Sweden of these ships on ground that they all are ships of small tonnage suitable for rivers, taking on lumber and discharging coal cargoes. Swedish shipping authorities he said attach great importance to possession of these small vessels at war’s end for transporting coal and other short-haul commodities. Having in mind Department’s 1584, August 9, 6 p.m.,23 I reverted to his statement to me the other day (my 2965, August 5, 10 p.m.) to the effect that Swedish Government apprehends Germany would seize such of this shipping as might be in its possession if the Swedes suddenly and openly announced cessation of trade with Germany, and asked him why, if the Germans were in such dire need of shipping, they had not lighted upon some pretext to take this shipping long ago. He answered that the Germans “dared not”; that the cargoes borne by these ships were of far more importance to Germany than possession of craft of this small individual tonnage. Now, however, if the Swedes should suddenly announce severance of all trade with Germany the Germans having nothing to lose would most certainly seize these ships which were mainly of use to the Germans in the short-haul Baltic traffic and Sweden, he said, simply cannot afford to lose them. I talked at considerable length with Mr. Boheman, as if the ideas were entirely my own, along lines indicated in Department’s 1578, August 8, 10 p.m., section 2, emphasizing particularly that the Swedish action which [Page 607] I thought would have the greatest effect in the opinion of my Government, would be action which might have a direct effect upon the course of the war anticipatory of military events rather than such action coming after and synchronized with Allied military successes. Boheman expressed himself as in agreement with this idea and said that he is daily urging it to his Government. He also stated that the action reported in the beginning of this telegram with regard to Swedish shipping to North Sea German ports is definitely of an “anticipatory” character. The line of argument I took, which follows the Department’s thought and my own, is entirely understood by Boheman, but I do not think we should minimize the difficulties he and others of the same mind are having with certain elements in the Swedish Government, not least of whom is the Prime Minister. Boheman explained that in 1940 they had adopted a certain line and policy of neutrality under spur of the most imperative necessity in order to save Sweden from the fate of Norway and other countries occupied by Germany. This policy had been observed with more or less consistency and had resulted successfully as far as saving Sweden from a military attack by Germany. For Sweden now, when the issue of the war against Germany is an undoubted fact, to kick the prostrate animal is repugnant to Swedish thinking. He said that he personally could not help but feel ashamed if Sweden now gave a kick to the dying German machine for any motive of prospective material benefit to Sweden. He said rather strongly that the Swedish Government would never consent to making their country a second “Turkey”. As to the stoppage in fact of all trade with Germany, he said that there was nothing that he more greatly desired and that he believed it would not be long until in fact all trade was stopped. As soon as Marshal Mannerheim has got Finland out of the war with Russia Boheman said that all trade with Germany on Swedish ships would cease. With reference to the German-controlled shipping in Swedish trade, Boheman said that they had intercepted a message from Germany to German Baltic shipping ordering them to accept no new charters and that all ships not in process of fulfilling a present engagement should repair at once to Lindau. These ships as Boheman has told me before are urgently needed by the Germans for provisioning and evacuation of their forces in the Baltic. Proper authorities he said are making every endeavor now to check on this intercepted message and to discover exactly what is happening (see my 3042, August 10, 9 p.m.24).
My 874, August 11, 7 p.m., repeats this to London.