740.00112 European War 1939/8–544: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)
1578. 1. We approve of the informal unofficial memorandum which you left with Boheman on July 24 (your 2931, August 3) but regret that the text was not transmitted earlier as its tone and content so thoroughly accord with our thought here that it might have influenced the contents of the Department’s 1520, July 31 to Stockholm.16
2. It seems apparent from your 2931, 2965 and 296617 that influential groups within the Swedish Government have, under the pressure of military and political developments in Europe, taken very much to heart the informal observations which you have made to Günther and Boheman as well as the observations made by the British to Hägglöf and are moving towards the withdrawal of all Swedish facilities from the service of the enemy which is at this time our most important policy goal with respect to Sweden. We do not of course minimize the importance of Swedish action, past and contemplated, with respect to Swedish shipping in enemy service. We are disappointed, however, to note that the Swedish Government, while seemingly disposed to undertake steps with respect to Germany which [Page 600] although taken in the name of Swedish interests alone also would be of benefit to the Allied cause, seems to contemplate taking these steps, in a spirit of caution, subsequent to certain political and military developments and not in time enough to have a decisive effect upon those political and military developments or, ultimately, upon the outcome of the war itself. Whether this apparent timidity is the result of the strength of pro-Axis or laissez-faire elements in the Swedish Government or whether it is another expression of the rather cynical policy outlined by Prime Minister Hansson in his speech of July 23 or whether it is the result of fear of some form of German retaliation is beside the point. We feel, and feel strongly, that, as you have well put it in the memorandum which you left with Boheman the war is developing so rapidly that positive Swedish action may soon be too late to have the significance desired by this Government. The time is ripe, and nearly over-ripe, for Sweden to take definitive action which will have a decisive effect upon the course of the war rather than to pursue a policy which although possibly consistent with Sweden’s short term interest cannot be a basis for a Swedish claim to the position to which she might otherwise be entitled after this war shall have been won through the sacrifice of Allied blood and treasure, without any significant contribution to such victory having been made by the Swedish Government.
3. We feel, therefore, that the minimum initial action which this Goverment can take, consistent with its responsibility to the American people for the prosecution of the war with all measures at our disposal, would be the presentation of the joint message referred to in the Department’s 1520, July 31, supplemented by strong oral representations. The British Government has now indicated substantial approval of the steps outlined in the Department’s 1520 but desires to await the return to London of Hägglöf and the reply he presumably is bringing to the observations made to him by Foot on July 5. (Our assumption is that his observations will in the main follow those which Boheman has already made to you.) In the meantime the British and American Governments have agreed to inform the Russians of our contemplated action and instructions to that end will be sent to British and American Embassies at Moscow.
4. We feel that your memorandum of July 24 and other informal conversations with Boheman should be implemented as soon as possible by a further informal conversation between you and either Boheman or Günther which might follow the sense of paragraph 2 above. It might be well for you to introduce into such conversation a strongly worded personal observation with regard to the importance which you know that your Government attaches to positive Swedish steps which will exert a timely and substantial influence [Page 601] on the course and duration of the war. You should also mention (in such a way that you may revert to the matter more officially later should you be instructed to do so) that should the Swedish Government fail spontaneously to take such definitive action, which manifestly would in the long run redound greatly to Sweden’s advantage, your Government might feel compelled to make formal demands upon Sweden, failure to satisfy which could result in the taking of measures among which might very possibly be: (1) the cutting off of basic rations (2) the extension of the blacklist to cover all Swedish firms engaged in trade with the enemy (3) the vesting by the Alien Property Custodian of Swedish commercial interests in the United States and (4) the withdrawal of the General License now pertaining to Swedish financial transactions, supplemented by other measures of a financial and commercial nature.
Sent to Stockholm for action, repeated for information only to London as Department’s no. 6265 and to Moscow as Department’s no. 1887.