753.94/7–744: Telegram

The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

2109. Our 2098, July 7, noon.85 I have just returned from the joint meeting with Salazar.

Salazar received our favorable response to Portugal’s desire for voluntary participation in the eventual liberation of Timor with evident satisfaction coupled, however, with the observation that he had first broached the matter to Campbell just over a year ago.86 He indicated his readiness to appoint an Army and a Navy officer to begin the staff talks at once and Campbell and I said that we would designate our respective Military and Naval Attachés for the preliminaries and that we would recommend that our respective Governments send to Lisbon at the earliest possible moment military and naval experts in Far Eastern matters. Incidently the rank of these officers was not brought out but we shall see our way more clearly when the Portuguese representatives have been named.

Salazar said that he has endeavored to obtain the evacuation of Timor through diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese but that these have proven endless and so far fruitless. He said that the only result was the sending of a Portuguese mission to Timor which added nothing to knowledge of conditions there. Macao with its large European population was in the nature of a hostage and this fact, of course, had to be taken into consideration. He added, therefore, that for the present he would continue to pursue the question through these channels even though the staff talks which would have to be conducted in secrecy were initiated.

In discussing the matter further, Campbell pointed out that while Churchill87 had publicly stated Britain’s intention to direct her full efforts to the Far Eastern war as soon as the war in Europe was terminated, it must be conceded that operations in the Pacific theater were at present almost entirely in the hands of the United States. This statement should be helpful to us in our current negotiations regarding the Santa Maria airfield.

Incidentally Salazar remarked that the Japanese must have sensed that something in the nature of the CCS decision was about to be communicated to the Portuguese because about 10 days ago the Japanese Minister asked if an agreement had been made “with the Americans” for Portuguese troops to participate in an expedition to [Page 45] Timor. Salazar replied simply “not yet.” This is an interesting side light on the uneasiness of the Japanese Military.

As a result of today’s interview, we may look for the first meetings to be held next week and our experts should accordingly be ready to leave on short notice.

Norweb
  1. Not printed.
  2. See Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. ii, pp. 525 ff.
  3. Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.