740.00112 European War 1939/10539: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)
915. From Department and FEA. Your 1273 of April 14,52 1178 of April 6 and Dept’s 674 of April [15] repeated to London as your 278, 257 and Dept’s 3016 respectively.
Section 1. Department and FEA desire that you prepare a memorandum in response to the Swedish memorandum of April 6 replying to our aide-mémoire of March 17. We leave the exact wording to your discretion, but suggest that the content be along the following lines:
“The Governments of the U.S. and U.K. cannot consider the Swedish memorandum of April 6 as an acceptable reply to their aide-mémoire of March 17 regarding the operations of the Anglo-American-Swedish Agreement of 1943. This is particularly the case in view of the fact that developments subsequent to March 17 have revealed other important additions to the grievances mentioned in the aide-mémoire of March 17.
The Governments of the U.S. and U.K. have made every effort to fulfill both in letter and in spirit their obligations to Sweden with respect [Page 543] to basic rations, and have considered sympathetically Swedish requests for additional supplies outside the basic rations. The Royal Swedish Government, on the other hand, has failed in important respects to fulfill its clear obligations and has generally shown a non-cooperative spirit with respect to matters outside the strict letter of the Agreement. Its replies to our previous statements of our grievances have been extremely legalistic. The two Governments believe, therefore, that the advantages secured by them as a result of the operation of the Agreement have fallen short both of their expectation and of their supply sacrifices in making basic rations available. The Governments of the U.S. and U.K. are, therefore, suspending the basic rations for Sweden as of the date of this memorandum and until the two Governments are satisfied that Sweden will carry out the terms of the Agreement in a cooperative spirit.”
Section 2. We do not wish any action apart from drafting to be taken by you with respect to the above memorandum pending the results of Griffis’ negotiations. If he reaches a stalemate, however, we wish to have the text of a memorandum along the above lines agreed to in advance in London, Stockholm, and Washington so that you will be in a position to present it immediately when you receive specific instructions to do so. It would not be presented if bearing discussions result satisfactorily. MEW is being requested to instruct Mallet to collaborate with you in the actions outlined under 1 and 2 above.
The vigor of the Swedish reaction to suspension of basic rations would probably depend largely on the size of existing reserve stocks in Sweden of essential imports through the blockade which cannot be replaced from areas under enemy control. Although the post-armistice position of Sweden would also be an important consideration, it is believed that so far as the Swedes are concerned, this would be secondary to maintenance of their neutrality and to their current supply position.
Although cancellation of the War Trade Agreements by the Swedes as a retaliatory measure would in theory at least leave the way open for complete integration of Swedish industry with the German war economy, it is certain that the Swedes would oppose German domination at least as effectively as they did in 1940 and 1941 so as to maintain their technical neutrality.
The sanctions at the disposal of the U.S. and the U.K. even without the War Trade Agreements are very substantial, and the absence of a War Trade Agreement might even increase our freedom of action in using such sanctions.
Section 3. Department and FEA desire that you arrange for the U.S. representatives to take up the following grievances regarding operation of War Trade Agreement at the next JSC meeting together with any additional grievances known to you which you consider merit inclusion:
[Page 544][Here follows a list of the more important Swedish commercial transactions with Germany and German-occupied Europe during the last 10 months in apparent violation of existing arrangements with the United States and the United Kingdom.]
The vigor with which we would press for reparation for these violations would of course depend in very large part upon the outcome of the current bearing negotiations; if it is satisfactory we would anticipate little difficulty in reaching a mutually agreeable compromise on other relatively less important matters. We would welcome a return to mutually cooperative spirit envisaged after last summer’s agreement, and would expect that to result from a satisfactory solution to bearings problem. If Swedes question our raising these additional issues during bearing negotiations they may be answered along above lines. However, we would of course want to reach an agreement as favorable to us as possible on these matters, and do not wish to give any impression that we regard the provisions of the War Trade Agreement, and Swedish violations of them, as unimportant.
Sent to Stockholm repeated to London. [Department and FEA.]
- Not printed.↩