Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV

740.00112 European War 1939/10751: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, May 9, 1944—8 p.m.
[Received 10:50 p.m.]

3771. For Department and Stone, FEA. Reference Department’s 3104, April 18. Memorandum set out below in paraphrase was taken to Stockholm by Griffis and Poteat as guide in their negotiations with Swedes.

1. Initial request at commencement of negotiations will be for immediate cessation of all deliveries of ball bearings, roller bearings, balls and rollers and ball-bearing machinery from SKF to any purchaser in enemy Europe. This embargo should be for negotiations for duration [for duration of negotiations’] and without prejudice to final result. Negotiators should be informed that it is our pressing desire to see that negotiations are concluded within a week.

2. Aim of negotiations arrangement with SKF for complete cessation until end of hostilities of all shipments of ball bearings etc. and ball-bearing machinery to enemy Europe. Any contract or undertaking should be avoided by negotiators if provision regarding cessation of shipments should be definitely subject to Swedish Government’s acquiescence. It is also of importance to continue employment in Sweden of highly skilled labor in ball-bearing industry so that it not attracted to employment in enemy Europe. In order to attain both these ends we are willing to place orders and to offer other concessions which are subject to negotiation.

[3.] If SKF refuses complete cessation of deliveries to enemy Europe negotiators may explore less advantageous concessions by SKF. Such concessions must be referred before acceptance to Washington or London. They may be either offers to go a considerable way to meet our wishes “within the framework of existing Swedish obligations” or wishes through abrogation of existing obligation of company though less drastic than cessation of all deliveries to enemy Europe.

4. (a) Advantage of most importance which could be gained within existing agreements framework would be prolongation of temporary embargo on shipments of ball bearings, etc., and ball-bearing machinery to enemy to latest possible date in 1944. An embargo for 1 month would have relatively little significance; an embargo up until December would go a long way toward meeting our needs.

(b) Orders for ball bearings, etc., have been accepted by Swedes up to ceilings for this year. Machinery orders have not yet been placed to limits of this year’s ceiling. Therefore, it is of extreme importance that an undertaking be secured from SKF as soon as possible that it will not accept additional orders for deliveries of machinery to enemy Europe during 1944 or for deliveries of bearings, etc., and machinery thereafter until end of war.

(c) An undertaking has already been given by SKF that no changes in orders already placed will be permitted. A renewal of this pledge is important as is the tieing of it to undertaking mentioned in (b) above. This is important in order to prevent placing of additional orders for ball-bearing machinery or for particular bearing sets, such as those necessary to maintain German productive equipment or to rebuild plants which have been bombed out.

5. (a) Should SKF refuse to cancel in whole its outstanding German contracts for bearings, because of publicity directed against that contract, company may be willing to completely cancel existing contract for bearing machinery, as most machinery ordered for 1944 has not yet been delivered. Cancellation of these orders is extremely important in negotiations’ early stages.

(b) Should SKF insist on token deliveries to enemy Europe, every attempt should be made to secure German contracts’ complete cancellation, although fulfillment of contracts to supply Finland, Norway, France, Belgium, Holland, et cetera may be allowed.

(c) If SKF is willing to eliminate deliveries of certain bearings to Germany, but not cease exports wholly, the first attempt should be to eliminate all deliveries of military types (in this case non-military types are to be defined as bearings of large sizes with intention that only those sizes which are large as not to be useful in equipment which is mobile will be exported). Should this attempt fail a second approach should be made which will allow exports of very small bearings. We would allow in first instance exports of British group I A (those bearings having up to 35 mm outer diameter). Then the next concession would be ball bearings in size group I B (bearings between 35 mm and 57 mm outer diameter). Next concession could be group I in all bearings (outer diameter 58 mm to 100 mm) excepting SKF numbers 6206 to 6211 and 6306 to 6308. (Assumption of this second line of approach is that because of widespread destruction to German aircraft industry fuselage bearings have become redundant.) Thrust bearings of any size might also be conceded.

Winant