740.00112 European War 1939/10674: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:59 p.m.]
1506. I saw Boheman this morning at my request before having received Department’s 776, April 27, 7 p.m. which was being decoded. I told him that if he agreed I would like to have a frank off-the-record talk with him and to ask some specific questions to which I hoped he might feel able to give me frank off-the-record answers. I reminded him of fact that he had previously given me the impression that although his Government’s reply to our ball-bearing communication was a flat negative, Swedes were exploring ways and means in which Allied aims could be met within framework of existing agreements. I also emphasized that what we want is immediate restriction on Swedish exports of ball bearings to Germany and that in our aide-mémoire of April 13 we had specifically mentioned an embargo for 3 months. I told him that with these factors in mind my Government had authorized me to negotiate either directly with Swedish Government or with SKF. Then I asked which procedure would suit Swedish Government—negotiations directly with Government or with SKF. Mr. Boheman said that probably SKF would be preferable. I then asked him if we negotiated with SKF and were able to reach an agreement would the Government intervene to prevent implementation of such an agreement. Boheman replied that it would be impossible for him to give such an assurance. I then asked him, having in mind previous statement that he had made to Mallet and me, reported in my 1454, April 25, 9 p.m., if Government policy and decision were not really determining factor in this situation. He reluctantly admitted that they were. He said that Government could not force SKF to production but that Government policy with respect to Sweden’s international obligations was the really dynamic factor.
Boheman then launched into a somewhat lengthy dissertation on iniquity of our pressure in this matter. He said he did not see how United States of all countries, in light of high moral standard it had always taken in international relations, could press a small neutral country in such a perilous position as Sweden to compliance with demands which if granted would put Sweden on brink of ruin and in a position where United States would not be able to give any assistance military, political or economic. He said that our offers of commodity concessions were of no practical value as if our demands were granted Germans would immediately close Gothenburg traffic; that furthermore if great Allied offensive should be stalled Sweden would be at mercy of Germany and would be ruined. He rejected entirely Allied [Page 528] thesis that Sweden is no longer in any danger of attack from Germany and said that he could give a score of detailed instances during course of present war in which if Sweden had followed Allied advice she would no longer exist.
He said further that spotlight of publicity which had centered on Sweden in this case together with nature and manner of Allied demands made the matter for Sweden a major political issue. At this point I suggested that a drastic diminution of deliveries to Germany by the company in immediate future could be arranged on business and operational grounds and would not be in reach of German agreements; that deliveries might be slowed down or even be eliminated by various methods. I suggested that personnel of SKF factory was very pro-Ally, and that effective strikes might be organized, that factory might even be sabotaged. Boheman replied that all of these measures had been thought of by the Swedes but he said that such procedure in Sweden was politically impossible; that furthermore because of spotlighting of this case any action of such a nature would become known to Germans together with real reasons; that it would be impossible to keep them secret; that we ourselves had raised insuperable difficulties to informal solution. Boheman having referred so often to “insuperable difficulties” of meeting our demands, I asked him if he would not consider the situation without reference to “difficulties” but with reference to “realistic possibilites” that a difficult matter was not necessarily an impossible one. He then spoke rather strongly about what he believed is our mistaken attitude as to intrinsic importance of Swedish ball-bearing exports to Germany, and said that as we attach such inordinate importance to it he felt that it had almost a sinister significance. I told him that I thought he was overstating the case and that if our responsible military authorities felt that a 7 to 12% increase in German ball-bearing supply was of vital importance then it must in fact be of vital importance. I reiterated terms of original démarche to effect that we were not claiming that Sweden had violated any of her engagements or that we had any right to make demand derived from our war trade agreement; that what we were asking was an entirely new thing and that we did not believe its accomplishment impossible.
Boheman persistently declined to give any assurance that we would be able to accomplish more than a partial result and said several times that it was impossible for Sweden to stop ball-bearing exports entirely during lifetime of present agreement with Germany. I then mentioned to him statement reported to have been made by Ståhle to Waring that Swedes were considering a solution of ball-bearing problem along lines of an embargo of exports to all belligerents. Boheman with apparently complete sincerity said that that was not true; that Government was not considering any such possibility. I [Page 529] can only infer from this that such a possibility has been considered merely by Ståhle personally and certain other lower ranking officials along the line. I do not yet rule it out as a possibility.
In view of Boheman’s previous statements that ways were being explored to meet our wishes within framework of agreements, and his apparent reluctance during this conversation to hold out any promise of substantial accomplishments, I asked him if matter was out of hands of Foreign Office and was being decided at highest level of policy. He hesitated a moment and said it was true. It must therefore be in hands of Prime Minister and his principal advisers. I asked Boheman if Foreign Office views would necessarily prevail and he replied very seriously “most certainly not”. I mentioned forthcoming visit of Mr. Stanton Griffis and told him that Mr. Griffis was coming here to assist me in this matter and that he was fully competent to handle business aspects of any arrangements.
Mr. Boheman was most courteous throughout our interview but very serious and genuinely depressed. He said that he would give very careful thought to what I had said. He telephoned me later this afternoon to say that it was agreeable to Government for us to go ahead in our talks with SKF with Government approval. I asked him how far we could rely on the Government to endorse and implement any agreement we might be able to reach with SKF. Mr. Boheman replied that it was impossible for him to give a commitment on this point until he knew what terms of agreement would be. I told him that I would make no personal move to contact SKF until after arrival of Mr. Griffis which I hoped would be in a day or two. Mr. Boheman who is leaving Stockholm this afternoon for a week informed me that if necessary in the interval he would return at once. During this talk with Mr. Boheman I made no reference whatever to Wallenberg’s conversations with Mallet nor to Wallenberg’s and Waring’s conversations with SKF officials. I told him that my approach this morning had been entirely a personal one for off-the-record purposes and that I had not consulted with Mallet. He understands of course that I am reporting my conversation.
My 344, April 28 repeats this to London.