Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV

740.00112 European War 1939/10598: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, April 20, 1944—3 p.m.
[Received 7:16 p.m.]

1368. My 1356, April 19, 7 p.m. I called to see Boheman this morning in hope that I might elicit from him some additional information regarding Swedish intentions with respect to our ball bearing request. He reaffirmed statement made yesterday that answer might be expected this week and that it would be negative. He went on to say that the extensive publicity incident to our démarche following on the Secretary’s speech of warning to neutrals has put Government in an exceedingly difficult position between the two belligerents as a favorable reply involving breach of agreement with Germany would be interpreted by latter as direct result of Allied pressure. Inasmuch as Boheman had stated categorically that Government’s decision was to make negative reply to our démarche, I did not attempt to argue that point. I asked him if they intended to make any constructive suggestions. He intimated that they did not have such intention as far as written reply was concerned. I expressed the hope that they were seeking for other ways of meeting our desires and mentioned what he had said yesterday to effect that both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister thought it might be possible to discuss attainment of our objectives within framework of existing agreements of Sweden. Although I made no reference direct or indirect to talks which Mallet has had with Wallenberg (my 1344, April 18, 9 p.m.¹³), I said that I felt confident that SKF could find ways of cooperating toward ends desired. Boheman did not dissent from this opinion and said his Government was seeking earnestly possible ways and means; but situation has, however, been rendered more difficult by our démarche and attendant publicity, as any action taken by SKF which would result in reduction of contract deliveries to Germany would immediately be interpreted by Germans as directly yielding by Swedes to Allied demands. Boheman said that, along with their written reply, I would receive a memorandum of certain facts in connection with ball bearing shipments to Germany. He went on to say that prior to Allied air attacks against German ball-bearing industry, Swedish exports of ball bearings were not more than 2% of German production; while it is impossible now to make any precise estimate of present percentage which Swedish exports bear to total German production, Boheman says that his Government experts and SKF officials do not believe it is greatly in excess of 7½%. Swedes have been under constant pressure from Germans to make special types of ball bearings for airplanes and tanks.

With exception of one order for a million kronor some time ago for special bearings these German requests have been all refused. Only this week he said Germans have again returned pressing for such deliveries and have offered 150 Focke-Wulfs of latest model for very early delivery, some immediately. This offer has been refused. All the bearings which are now being delivered under agreement to Germany, Boheman insists, are of standard type and are not special bearings for airplanes and tanks. He said that it is only for Great Britain that SKF is making such special bearings. He said, with apparent sincerity, that Swedes cannot understand constant accusations emanating from Allied quarters and American in particular, that Sweden is exporting special types of bearings to Germany. He said that all bearings manufactured in Germany itself, as well as elsewhere, bear the inscription “SKF” and that it seems to Swedes that Allied authorities are attributing all such bearings in use by Germany to Swedish provenance. He cannot explain persistent belief on our part that Sweden is exporting these bearings to any other cause. He said that on assumption that his knowledge of Swedish exports of bearings to Germany is correct and that no bearings are going except those of standard make and in small quantity relative to German total production, he does not see how we can sustain our claim that Swedish exports are causing the death of countless American soldiers. He said that perhaps Allies are not aware that subsequent to their concentrated bombing of Germany the German production of special ball bearings had been scattered all over Germany and in occupied territories in small plants. Statements along line of foregoing, I anticipate, will be in special memorandum Boheman spoke of above which will accompany their reply. Boheman also made it clear that the wording of the American aide-mémoire had been considered offensive and he went so far as to intimate that we had gone the wrong way toward obtaining our objective.

I mentioned recent German protest in training of Norwegian police in Sweden and also discovery of ordnance maps of Sweden at Hälsingborg.¹⁵ Boheman said that German note on Norwegian training had been very sharp and unpleasant but that he did not connect that note nor the map incident with Allied démarche on ball bearings. He said that there was really no connection and that in his opinion note on Norwegian trainees and map incident are more directly connected with Hitler’s anger against Sweden because of her action in Finnish-Russian peace feelers.¹⁶ German reaction to Swedish efforts in this direction has been much sharper and more menacing than has been allowed to appear in German press. Boheman thinks real danger from Germany will be if Hitler becomes convinced that Sweden is either unwilling or unable to withstand Allied pressure and if he should suspect that there is any possibility even of Sweden allowing Allies use of air bases.¹⁷ Fact that Germany is beleaguered on all sides would not in Boheman’s opinion and in opinion of others here be deterrent to his ordering an attack on Sweden for purely military reasons of a preemptive nature, if he thought Sweden had aligned herself with Allies.

My 303 April 20, 3 p.m. repeats this to London.

Johnson

13. Not printed.
15. On April 14, 1944, Hälsingborg customs officials confiscated a large shipment of German-made military maps of Sweden.
16. See Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iii, pp. 214, 218, 220–221, 226–228, 236, 237, 284, 304, 310, and 311–313.
17. For correspondence regarding the use of Swedish air facilities by United States military authorities, see pp. 683 ff.