740.00112 European War 1939/10335: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)
Washington, March 16,
1944—6 p.m.
1986. For the Ambassador and Riefler.
- 1.
- The Department and FEA continue to be seriously disturbed over Swedish ball- and roller-bearing exports to enemy Europe. The attainment of the six objectives outlined in Embassy’s 1585 of February 26 would prove most helpful in reducing this aid to the enemy. However, we must continue to seek additional means to eliminate such exports completely.
- 2.
- We do not have sufficient information to determine the reason for the failure of the past preemptive program as reported in your 1585. We shall appreciate a full and confidential report on this subject. We are willing to join with MEW in any program of preemption, direct or indirect, which might have a chance of success. Indirect preemption might entail the offer of an inducement to SKF, monetary or otherwise, with a view to a limitation of exports of bearings below the established ceilings or possibly a complete cessation of such exports. Please let us have your views and recommendations as to type of action which might be pursued in this connection.
- 3.
- We agree with MEW that the possibility of using blacklist threats and other possible pressure on SKF should be fully re-examined. It would be possible to refuse licenses for the transmittal of funds from the SKF subsidiary here to SKF in Sweden. These points are being reviewed here. In the meantime we shall appreciate your further comments.
- 4.
- The following comments relate to the first four objectives set
forth in your 1585:
[Page 477]
- (a)
- As to objective numbered 1, in addition to the SKF undertaking referred to in point 4 of your 1907 of March 8,55 we feel that assurances concerning the even spacing of deliveries in 1944 should be given directly to the United States and British Governments, either by SKF or preferably by the Swedish Government. Moreover, the limitation should apply to each rubric and also to ball-bearing machinery. However, in pressing the Swedes on this point, we should be careful not to give them reason to believe that we are specifically confirming the approval of shipments during 1944 of the full amounts set forth in the War Trade Agreement. For example, we must take the position that there shall be deducted from 1944 shipments amounts equivalent to the excess of 1943 over 1942 shipments, such deductions; to be made during the first half year. Moreover, if we can find other means of further reducing 1944 shipments, our hands should not be tied.
- (b)
- As to objective numbered 2, we assume that Hägglöf’s statement as reported under point 1 of your 1907 of March 8 means that the full information requested will be given.
- (c)
- As to objective numbered 3, we should prefer to obtain a definite assurance from SKF or from the Swedish Government rather than rest solely on Hägglöf’s statement as reported under point 3 of your 1907. Moreover, it appears to us the reservation concerning minor changes “regarded as normal in the ball bearing trade” may leave too large a loophole.
- (d)
- As to objective numbered 4, we do not understand on what grounds it is believed the Swedes might agree to requisition ball bearings, etc. From the point of view of the United States supply authorities we would have no objection to such action on the part of the Swedish authorities. We assume that the British supply authorities will be consulted as to United Kingdom requirements. We have no information here as to possible Russian needs. We assume that the “requisitioning” would have to be financed by the British and ourselves in some way. Please comment more fully on this point.
Hull
- Not printed.↩