740.0011 European War 1939/33210: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 15—11:59 p.m.]
498. I venture to invite Department’s attention to existing factors tending to stiffen Swedish will to neutrality and having direct bearing on probable Swedish attitude to Anglo-American efforts to secure immediate reduction of iron ore exports as well as advantages in other directions (see Department’s 227, February 11, 8 p.m.34 and previous related correspondence).
(1) The war between Finland and Russia35 appears to be rapidly approaching a crisis. Even most sober and realistic elements in Swedish Government are seriously concerned as to course events may take. [Page 471] Possibility of Finnish efforts to obtain peace with Russia is now in balance. German reaction thereto unknown but there are 6 or 7 German divisions in Finland. Aside from situation of acute danger to Sweden which would arise in event Germany should offer military resistance to a Finnish attempt to make separate peace, it seems hardly necessary to point out that total ignorance and much distrust of Russian intentions and apprehension of Russian forces reaching borders of Sweden alone would be major factors in present Swedish state of mind. Government is prepared to face this situation including danger of fighting on Finnish soil and of influx of Finnish refugees into Sweden. I believe Sweden will fight if attacked but it will not by any act of its own invite an attack.
(2) Uncertainties of Polish situation and fear that Anglo-Saxon powers may have decided or felt compelled to give Russia a free hand in Eastern Europe is matter likewise of serious concern and intimately connected with Finnish problem. These apprehensions are pivoted around growing strength and aggressiveness of Russia and what some Swedes fear is unwillingness or inability of Anglo-Saxon powers to exercise control by influence or otherwise on Russian policy, ambitions and action. Fact that many Swedes have an exaggerated apprehension of Russian danger does not lessen reality of their fear.
Slow apparent progress of Allied military operations in Mediterranean and uncertainty as to time necessary to accomplish purposes of continental invasion.
Foregoing considerations all combined are now tending to stiffen basic Swedish will to neutrality. Sweden is between the two fires of Russia and Germany. Their natural instinct in face of these potential dangers to Sweden’s neutrality is to maintain it with every means in their power. Swedish Government and Foreign Office in particular are acutely conscious of Allied pressure exerted on Turkey36 and Spain37 and of results to date of that pressure. They confidently expect that Sweden will be next objective and tend to regard our stiff attitude on what they choose to consider minor infractions to war trade agreement as entering wedge of that pressure. In my opinion no form of peaceful pressure exerted by us on Sweden to secure material advantages for Allied position would be considered and decided by Swedish Government on any other basis than how such action would affect essential security of Sweden. It is not a moment in my view when Swedes can be pushed or pressed to make concessions in our favor which would complicate their position any further vis-à-vis Germany which country is fully aware that Swedes desire their defeat. They will have to admit necessity of living up to contractural obligations, but they would not necessarily be disposed to accept without question our concept and interpretation of what the obligations are. Any setback in United Nations’ position such [Page 472] as slow development of military plans and pursuance by Russia of policies potentially dangerous in Swedish eyes and not always in concert with their Allies would cause cautious Swedes to take here stock of their actual position vis-à-vis both Russia and Germany and would tend to produce extreme caution in action. Our position for pressure and bargaining could undergo favorable change any day by force of military events. Moreover, liquidation of Russo-Finnish war on terms which would leave Finland an independent state in fact and not cause heavy influx of Finnish refugees into Sweden should greatly improve Allied position provided Germans do not elect to fight out issue with Russia on Finnish soil.
I venture to suggest that foregoing situation as it appears here receive consideration in connection with framing of any immediately planned protest to Sweden or pressure for advantages. My 95, February 14 repeats this to London.
These comments likewise have a direct bearing on Department’s most secret telegram No. 16, January 3, 10 p.m.38 to which I am not yet prepared to give an answer. This final paragraph not repeated to London.
- Telegram not printed.↩
- For correspondence pertaining to the war between Finland and the Soviet Union, see vol. iii, pp. 556 ff.↩
- See vol. v, pp. 814 ff.↩
- See pp. 297 ff.↩
- Not printed.↩