Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV

740.00112 European War 1939/9978: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

Washington, January 25, 1944—7 p.m.

618. Refer Stockholm’s 37 of January 5, 88 of January 10, and 139 of January 15 to Department, Embassy’s 199 of January 8²⁹. In amplification of and in addition to the approach described in your 484 of January 18, Department and FEA believe that the time has come to call to the attention of the Swedish Government our dissatisfaction with observance by them of their obligations to us and to take positive steps to protect our interests. The violation of the iron ore ceiling and the revelation that there is a nonferry traffic via Bothnian ports which the Swedes do not apparently regard as falling within the terms of their 120,000–ton limitation are the two main causes for our disappointment. We are also greatly displeased with the apparent laxity shown by the Swedes in carrying out the terms of the new War Trade Agreement, particularly with regard to continuing exports of transport equipment, producer gas units, and exports of grains to Finland.

We believe, therefore, that representations in the most emphatic terms should now be made by us on these issues and that we should take steps designed to reach immediate solutions satisfactory to us. A satisfactory settlement of the iron ore question is particularly urgent. In fact, unless the objectives set out in our joint memorandum of December 1 are promptly attained, we shall be too late to affect shipments of iron ore during the first quarter of this year, which is the most important period in which to obtain a reduction. In addition, we feel it is most important that the 7.5 million ton ceiling for 1944 be reduced by the excess of iron ore shipments to enemy Europe in 1943 over the ceiling of 9.9 million tons. This excess, according to the figures supplied in Stockholm’s 139 of January 15, amounts to 341,737 tons, and we are unwilling to accept the intended Swedish proposal of a deduction of 85,817 tons, which ignores (a) the 1943 ceiling of 9.9 million tons (which incidentally was recently confirmed by Boheman), and (b) the excess shipments in 1943 to enemy Europe.

Therefore, please seek the agreement of MEW on the presentation of a note along the following lines:

“The Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom are profoundly concerned over the interpretation given by the Swedish Government to its undertakings with respect to exports of iron ore to enemy territory and they cannot understand why export prohibitions which have been mutually agreed upon continue to be infracted. In this connection the attention of the Swedish Government is drawn to the Annex attached indicating some of the infractions and derogations of the agreements.

As has been indicated in their joint note of December 1 the two Governments have learned with surprise that Swedish exports of iron ore to Germany in 1943, the same year in which the new War Trade Agreements were negotiated by them with Sweden, were not only higher than in any preceding war year but in fact are so high as to constitute an infraction of the obligations undertaken by Sweden to the U.K. in 1939.³⁰ In this connection, while the two Governments are aware of certain efforts made by the Swedish Government to reduce these exports, they cannot accept the premise that Swedish adherence to the ceiling was or is in any sense dependent on any military action by the Allied Governments.

The two Governments are particularly surprised to learn only recently from the Swedish Government that there exists a very sizeable and important traffic in coal, coke and cement from Germany to Norway across northern Sweden, a traffic which the Swedish Government seeks to except from the terms of its declaration concerning transit traffic, the carrying out of which they considered as one of the basic considerations which led them to sign the War Trade Agreements. The signing by the Governments of the U.S. and U.K. was with the understanding that these declarations covered all traffic from the Continent to Norway and Finland through Sweden, whether by the ferry routes or otherwise.

The Government of the U.S. and the Government of the U.K. consider that the Bothnian traffic is of material assistance to the military effort of their enemies. It is a traffic which is not a normal peacetime route but largely began after the occupation of Norway. Moreover, it is composed of goods which are in effect war materials as virtually all coal, coke and cement transported via the Bothnian routes is utilized by the German military authorities to assist them to attack Allied shipping, to maintain their oppressive occupation of the Norwegian people and therefore must be directly contrary to the best interests of Sweden.

(On this point the Ministers should interpolate orally that the Swedish Government will have noted that the German battleship Tirpitz is reported to be in Norwegian waters. They will also recall that in a recent naval engagement off the north cape, the battleship Scharnhorst was sunk by British naval units, that Allied convoys are constantly being attacked by aircraft, submarines, and surface craft operating from Northern Norway and that therefore this is a zone of active military operations. Consequently, the two Governments, assuming that the Swedish Government would wish to avoid such aid to their enemies, will desire to discontinue the Bothnian traffic immediately.)

The practical realities of the situation and the present decisive stage of the war make the stoppage of this traffic a matter of the utmost importance.

In the light of the above circumstances, the Governments of the U.S. and the U.K. find it necessary to seek from the Swedish Government immediate assurances:

1. That in accordance with the joint memorandum of December 1, the Swedish Government will not, during the first quarter of 1944, permit exports of iron ore to enemy territory to exceed 488,000 tons nor allow any more than 200,000 tons to be shipped in any one month.

2. That the excess of iron ore shipments to enemy Europe in 1943 over the ceiling of 9.9 million tons will be subtracted from the 1944 ceiling of 7.5 million tons and that the Swedish Government will make satisfactory arrangements to effect this deduction during the first 6 months of 1944.

3. That, in addition to the 120,000 ton limitation on transit traffic, whether ferried or not, the traffic via Bothnian ports to Trondheim or Narvik or any other regions north of Trondheim in Norway or traffic via the Bothnian ports to Finland will be completely and promptly discontinued.

4. That the Swedish authorities will take the necessary steps to ensure that there shall be no further infractions of the provisions of the War Trade Agreements and that restitution will be made for whatever infractions of the Agreement have occurred.

5. That, in accordance with Section VII of the Swedish Declaration in the recent War Trade Agreements, with respect to commodities or groups of commodities whose export in 1944 was regulated by the War Trade Agreements, arrangements will be made so that exports during the first 6 months of 1944 will not exceed the average rate of exports during the corresponding period of the 5 years from 1938 through 1942.

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom emphasize the great importance which they attach to the prompt granting of the above assurances and to the reduction to an absolute minimum of the aid which Germany and its satellites receive from Sweden. The two Governments feel that they should recall to the Royal Swedish Government that they entered into their obligations under the War Trade Agreements solely on the basis of their expectation that the Swedish Government would take all measures within its power to reduce the aid which Germany and its satellites received from Sweden including complete fulfillment of Sweden’s undertakings in the War Trade Agreements which constitute the minimum basis for the wartime trade relations between the three countries. They do not consider the requests for the assurances sent out above are either unreasonable or of a character with which the Swedish Government cannot comply.”

We believe that the British and U.S. representatives should add orally after presenting the foregoing communication:

“We have been further instructed to state orally that our Governments wish to emphasize the urgency of obtaining the Swedish reply to the foregoing requests as soon as possible, that is within say 10 days or 2 weeks.”

In the event that we fail to obtain promptly the required assurances, we are of the opinion that appropriate measures should be taken to protect our interests.

The point has been raised here as to whether it might be desirable to delay the granting of navicerts for goods to Sweden until we receive satisfactory assurances. In such event, it is not proposed that the Swedes be advised of this but that we simply employ delaying tactics in granting export licenses and navicerts. Please obtain the views of MEW on this point and cable urgently. We do not wish to delay action on the note pending determination of this question.

The Annex to the proposed note is contained in a following telegram.³¹

Repeated to Stockholm as our no. 126 of January 25.

Hull

29. Telegrams 88, 139, and 199 not printed.
30. See footnote 4, p. 456.
31. Telegram 619, January 25, 1944, 8 p.m., to London, not printed.