711.52/418: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 20—3:41 a.m.]
1341. I showed Hoare your 101 [1021] April 13, 7 p.m.,98 last night. He was disturbed and indignant. He said the telegram was a very bad distortion of the sense of the conversation reported. It omitted Halifax’s “telling” arguments with which Halifax reported Acheson had been impressed. Hoare especially resented the implication that he had not backed me up, and maintained that he had supported my efforts all along.
He further said that the Department’s telegram was now an old story since he had word from London that the Foreign Office was not at all satisfied with Acheson’s arguments and had instructed Halifax to make strong representations direct to the Secretary, which he had done on April 15.
Hoare said that what he objected to most, and in this he was completely supported by the British Government, was what he termed the indefinite postponement of a greatly desired settlement merely for the sake of the insignificant amount of 60 tons of wolfram, and at the risk of grave consequences for us if a prompt settlement should not be made.
He believes Spain cannot be forced to forego the 60 tons exports between now and June 30 or that if it is eventually forced to forego them a great deal more wolfram will find its way into German hands clandestinely than if we accept Jordana’s latest proposal.
He said that, moreover, it was his personal opinion that the State Department was failing to make the legitimate political capital out of the situation that it might make. The Secretary had made a very important address99 which should be followed by some immediate practical success. An immediate agreement drastically limiting wolfram exports to insignificant amounts together with satisfactory conclusion of other outstanding difficulties such as closing the German Consulate in Tangier, return of Blue Division, Italian ships, etc., would constitute such a success, and the mere announcement of these developments would place us in a far better position to secure early satisfactory results from negotiations with Turkey, Sweden and Portugal.
[Page 389]He said that otherwise the Secretary’s speech would be followed by a kind of anticlimax and other neutrals would pluck up courage to resist.
He said furthermore the Department overlooked British dependence on Spain for phosphates and iron ore. British were running out of pesetas and Hoare had given orders to stop British purchases of wolfram next week in order to conserve pesetas.
He said with some jest that the United States was supposed to want everything or nothing and if it persevered in that attitude he might as well go home and stay there.
I expressed the opinion to Hoare that he was discounting the pressure on Spain resulting from its increasingly urgent need of petroleum products. I said I believed we had a good chance of getting the Spaniards to give way on the 60 tons. If the amount was insignificant to us Hoare stated it must also seem insignificant to Spain in comparison with its increasingly urgent need for petroleum and other commodities. I said I also wanted a prompt settlement as did my Government but not necessarily according to Jordana’s last proposal.
I expressed the opinion also that we could impress upon the Spaniards the probability that in a relatively short time they will be cut off from Germany and that the pressure to export to Germany will therefore have disappeared. I said that if the Spaniards thought they were gambling on what Germany might do in retaliation the gamble must appear very slight to them in comparison with the risk of being deprived indefinitely of petroleum.
I must say frankly that I appeared to make no impression on Hoare. His attitude toward the United States was resentful and critical during the entire conversation and he did not give way in any respect.
My own present view is as follows:
The fact that Spain has maintained a temporary embargo on wolfram exports for close to 3 months while being deprived at the same time of petroleum products indicates that the Spanish Government views very seriously the probable results on its economy and on its relations with the United Nations and possibly on its tenure in office, of further exports of wolfram to Germany without our consent.
During this period our military position has greatly improved and Spain’s need for petroleum has become much more urgent while the risks involved in failure to reach a satisfactory agreement with Spain, which I pointed out months ago, still exist, it seems to me that those risks to us are smaller as time goes on. Inversely it seems to me that the risks to Spain of failure to reach agreement with us are greater as time goes on.
[Page 390]I favor reaching a prompt agreement with Spain but I consider that our willingness to agree to Spanish exports of wolfram in the amount of 600 tons during 1943 [1944] represents an important compromise on our part. I consider that the Department in the light of its knowledge of the overall situation should determine whether we should maintain our agreement to exports of 600 tons with no further exports between now and June 30 or whether we should agree to exports of less than 600 tons with minimum exports between now and June 30.
In my opinion Britain’s action in depriving foreign governments of means of confidential communication with Britain will have a favorable effect in Spain. Spaniards resent threats and what they consider to be insults. They are, however, very much impressed with direct action even though it involves great inconvenience to them.
Furthermore, the inept “peace campaign” of the Spanish press and the serious attitude which the Embassy has taken towards it has placed the Spanish Government on the defensive and strengthened our own position.
It seems to me furthermore that the circumstance that Turkey, Portugal and Sweden are well aware that despite the fact that Spain has maintained a temporary embargo on wolfram exports for nearly 3 months [but] has, in the absence of a definitive agreement, continued to be deprived of petroleum, should impress those Governments with the seriousness with which we view the general subject of trade in strategic materials between the neutrals and Germany.
I consider from my necessarily limited viewpoint that we therefore have already established in Spain a helpful basis for exerting further pressure on the other neutral countries involved especially on Portugal which as an ally of Britain may properly be expected to go much further than Spain in declining to give economic aid to Germany at this stage of the war.
Furthermore such pressure on other neutrals would in turn be helpful to us in our continued negotiations with Spain assuming that there will be some further delay in reaching an agreement.
While I am of course not authorized or desirous of making suggestions regarding Portugal, I may say that from the point of view of our position in Spain I believe it would not be disadvantageous to us if Portugal should really fulfill its alliance with Britain by entering the war at least against Japan and thereby provide Spain through the instrumentality of the Iberian block which Spain continues to respect with additional grounds for denying economic aid to the Axis.
Repeated to London and Lisbon.