711.52/417

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

Participants: Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador
Mr. Thorold
Mr. Acheson

Lord Halifax called at my request. I stated that the Secretary was disturbed at the course which the Spanish negotiations seemed to be taking. As a result of the Prime Minister’s communication to the President, it had been agreed between the Department and the British Embassy to recede from the position of asking the Spanish for a total embargo on wolfram and to agree to the export after July 1 of 300 tons, making a total of 600 tons for the year. On the basis of this action by the Spanish and further concessions which had already been agreed upon, petroleum shipments will be resumed. Both Ambassadors had now reported that the Spanish Government would settle the matter provided that we would agree to the export of 60 tons between now and the first of July. We were informed that the Foreign Office had instructed Ambassador Hoare to agree to this upon the receipt by the American Ambassador of similar instructions.

I said that in the Secretary’s opinion this concession would have the most serious repercussions. It would utterly frustrate any chance of success in our joint approach to Sweden to stop or reduce the export of ball bearings.89 It would have the same effect upon our joint approach to Turkey in regard to chrome,90 and it could be expected to stiffen the resistance of the Swiss and Portuguese in reaching an acceptable understanding with us. Furthermore, the Secretary on Sunday night had stated a very strong attitude in regard to trade by the neutrals with the enemy.91 As the Ambassador had seen from the press the Secretary’s statement had voiced the unanimous opinion of the American people. Should this Government now be required to take action inconsistent with that statement, it might well impair the excellent effect which the speech had in uniting the country upon the entire international program. Therefore, the issue was much greater than 60 tons of wolfram, even though that would be represented as the export of two and one-half million dollars of a vital war material.

I said that in my opinion the effort to secure a settlement based on a suspension of exports until July had never had a real chance, since [Page 384] the Spanish had apparently perceived that our two Governments were not firmly united upon it. I urged that another and real effort to achieve such a settlement be made.

Lord Halifax asked what further arguments the Ambassadors could use. I suggested that they stress the great disservice which the Spaniards were doing themselves in insisting upon immediate export. American opinion was thoroughly aroused upon this subject. Even if the Spanish were successful in obtaining our acquiescence, it would be at such tremendous cost to themselves that they should not seek it. Once their communication with Germany was cut and the needs of the liberated areas were required to be filled, the Spaniards could not expect that we would continue to be concerned about their needs if we felt that we had been coerced into agreeing to a most abhorrent trade with the enemy.

Lord Halifax went over the familiar arguments—the experience of Sir Samuel Hoare, the fact that he on the spot had a better appraisal of the situation than those who were distant from it, the small amount of wolfram involved, the risk of a breakdown of negotiations and the export of a far larger amount to Germany. I said that I could not imagine that the Spaniards would be so foolish at this stage of the war as to permit a breakdown of negotiations by an action which would arouse intense hostility here.

Lord Halifax asked whether he could say to the British Government that we did not wish the negotiations to break down and that, if it was impossible to get Spanish agreement to the course proposed, we would agree to their proposal. I said that this was the very type of approach which seemed to me to spell defeat; that, of course, we were not proposing an ultimatum and would always consider developments as they occurred. It seemed to me that the important thing was to get real agreement between the two Governments, that a most determined effort should be made involving all the pressure that we could both bring upon the Spaniards to suspend shipments until July 1.

Lord Halifax said that he would send a telegram reporting our conversation and would get in touch with me as soon as he had a reply.

Dean Acheson
  1. See pp. 456 ff.
  2. See vol. v, pp. 819834 passim.
  3. For text of Secretary Hull’s radio address of April 9 on the foreign policy of the United States, see Department of State Bulletin, April 15, 1944, p. 335.