740.00119 European War 1939/11–1144: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 12—4:10 p.m.]
4323. ReDeptel 2602, November 3, 9 p.m. 1. As far as this Embassy is aware, the only British-Russian exchanges of views on Rumania since Ambassador Harriman’s departure resulted from two notes of the British Ambassador to Molotov dated October 26. The first note, expressing concern lest political differences in Rumania might degenerate into civil turmoil accompanied by armed clashes, was reported in my 4118, October 27, 7 p.m.55 Particular concern was expressed over failure to disarm “Communist guards”. The second note, regarding concern of British Government over failure of Rumanian Government to break off relations with Japan,56 was reported in my 4119, October 27, 8 p.m.55 In reply to the first note Vyshinski stated in letter dated November 2 that situation in Rumania to which British Ambassador’s note drew attention was connected primarily with tendency of certain political groups in Rumania to evade or delay fulfillment of Armistice terms and not with behavior of any particular detachments. The note [added that the] necessary steps are being taken by the Soviet High Command, which is directing the activities of the ACC in Rumania, for the disarmament by the Rumanian authorities of all non-governmental groups and organizations in Rumania. Soviet reply to the second note was reported separately in my telegram 4920, November 9, 6 p.m.55 In addition to this the British Ambassador, in the memorandum which he left with Vyshinski on November 3 in connection with removal by Russians of oil company equipment, referred to the general harm being caused to Rumanian economy by Soviet lack of discrimination. He mentioned particularly that due to policies of Control Commission only a small part of Autumn grain crop had been sown.
2. The factors which have determined the Soviet attitude toward Rumania are, in my opinion, the following: [Page 259]
- (a)
- Soviet resentment at participation of Rumanian troops in the invasion of the Ukraine and particularly at Rumanian aspirations to Transnistria and its administration by Rumanian officials while under enemy occupation;
- (b)
- Non-Slavic racial origin and Latin Catholic cultural traditions which automatically exclude Rumania from the bond of the all Slav brotherhood;
- (c)
- Russian contempt of the Rumanian upper class as unprincipled, pleasure-loving and corrupt;
- (d)
- Failure of Rumanians to acclaim Red Army with any marked show of affection;
- (e)
- Resentment and jealousy of the relative prosperity which Rumania was found by Russians to have been enjoying under Nazi occupation, a prosperity offensive to Russians as contradictory to their propaganda regarding misery of peoples of occupied Europe, and challenging to their conception that the standard of living in defeated countries should not be higher than in the Soviet Union itself;
- (f)
- A determination that wherever this is not inhibited by political considerations, the maximum in goods and services shall be exacted from ex-enemy territories by way of restitution for the miseries inflicted on the occupied areas of the Soviet Union.
Given this background, Russian action in Rumania has been dominated by the determination to make the country pay through the nose for its past transgressions and by a pronounced distrust and lack of sympathy for practically all of its political leaders and groupings. Unfortunately this” does not seem to have been balanced off by any adequate sense of responsibility on the part of Soviet military authorities in Rumania for political stability in that country or for economic stability in central Europe.
The results of this in the economic sphere are well known to the Department. In the political sphere, the Russians have concentrated on trying to undermine the authority of the Liberal and Peasant Party leaders57 who command the support of the bulk of anti-fascist forces in Rumania. They have set out to accomplish this by criticizing the attitude of those leaders toward fulfillment of the armistice terms, by accusing them of failing to purge fascist elements, by failing to give them support in their efforts to consolidate political life, and by urging immediate adoption of extreme measures of social and agrarian reform which have strong popular appeal but for the immediate promulgation of which at this moment no serious statesman could take responsibility. While the Rumanian Communists are made the spokesmen for these demands, there are indications that Moscow has no great confidence in their influence or ability. It expects and requires their obedience but does not feel itself obliged to grant them full support. It is probably contemptuous of them for their weakness, [Page 260] and reluctant to encourage them to take on too much responsibility at this time. The result of all this has been that Moscow’s influence on Rumanian political life has been consistently negative and has evidently operated to paralyze Rumanian efforts to cope with the situation created by Russian requisitioning and mismanagement in the economic field.
I have a feeling that the Soviet authorities in Moscow have recently become conscious of the fact that this situation in Rumania may have repercussions unfavorable to the Soviet Union. In particular, I suspect they are worried lest tales of hardship and chaos attendant upon Soviet occupation of Rumania should operate further to stiffen the backs of the Hungarians, whose evident terror of the Red Army and continued military resistance is causing concern in Moscow. It is possible, though not certain, that representations of British representatives in Rumania and of the British Ambassador and myself here have also played a part in shaking Soviet complacence. Vyshinski’s present visit, in my opinion, should be interpreted in this light rather than exclusively in connection with alleged Rumanian failure to live up to armistice terms, and I think there is reason to hope that it will result in more reasonable and more cooperative policies on the part of the Soviet military authorities.
Sent to Department as 4323; repeated to Caserta for Berry as No. 26.