740.00119 E.W. 1939/9–1544: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 15—11:09 p.m.]
3522. I wish to make the following observations concerning the Rumanian armistice negotiations which have just been concluded:
1. It was evident that the Russians entered upon these negotiations with the determination that the field should largely be theirs and that we should give them pretty much of a free hand in arranging the armistice terms and the subsequent treatment of the Rumanians. This attitude doubtless is based on the fact that Rumania is a neighbor and it is justified by them by the fact that they had suffered most [Page 235] from Rumanian hostilities and had done the most to knock Rumania out of the war on the German side.
2. The United States attitude throughout the negotiations tended to bear them out in the feeling described above and was appreciated by them accordingly. They believe, I think, that we lived up to a tacit understanding that Rumania was an area of predominant Soviet interest in which we should not interfere.
3. The tendency of the British to come forward in the course of the preliminary negotiations with a large variety of suggestions, questions and ideas, appeared to cause bewilderment and some annoyance to the Soviet negotiators. The Russians readily accepted the British proposals which strengthened Allied (Soviet) control over Rumania as well as drafting changes but in general refused to make any concessions of substance.
The repeated arguments brought forward by the British with respect to the fixed sum of reparations to the Soviet Union, while doubtless well founded in the basic conception of tripartite collaboration, were received by the Russian mind as expressing a reluctance to recognize the extent their country had suffered at the hands of the Rumanians and a desire to deprive them of their just compensation. The British suggestions would undoubtedly have been reasonable enough in any negotiations between western Allies. In the case of the Russians, they did not meet with understanding.
4. Although the combined Soviet-English-American Delegations met for a total period of over 7 hours with the Rumanians, there was little serious discussion with them of any point of the armistice terms. Molotov, who acted as Chairman for the Allied Delegations, did not enter into any detailed consideration of the arguments and propositions advanced by the Rumanians. Although he allowed them to talk at great length he did not fairly face or discuss the points they raised and rode over them brusquely whenever he felt that enough time had been spent on a given point. He repeatedly reminded them that they had gone as far as Stalingrad with the Germans, and that their action in leaving the German camp had come only at a time when it had been dictated by overwhelming and unanswerable military considerations. This procedure, however justifiable it may have been in the circumstances, left a certain amount of bitterness with the Rumanians, since they did not feel that they had been able to establish any real basis for an exchange of ideas with the Russians. Molotov did, however, agree to make a few changes in the terms as originally presented.
On the other hand, the Rumanian delegates told me after the conclusion of the armistice that its terms were as favorable as they had a right to expect but were greatly concerned about how they [Page 236] would be interpreted and enforced by the Soviet Command. During the negotiations their objections were directed chiefly against the economic provisions and the extent to which the Allied (Soviet) High Command was given control of the economic life and the governmental machinery of Rumania. With respect to the economic measures they were concerned over their capacity to pay, in addition to the fixed indemnity, the cost to Rumania of maintaining Soviet troops and indemnity for damage to the refineries. Several of the delegates stated privately that the cost of rebuilding these refineries would amount to as much as the indemnity to the Soviet Union and that in any event Rumania did not have the facilities for such reconstructions.
In addition the Rumanians endeavored to obtain the insertion in the armistice of a specific undertaking providing for the departure of Allied troops at the cessation of hostilities with Germany. Molotov refused to consider such a proposal on the ground that it was premature; and the Rumanians had to be content with his statement that the departure of Allied troops as soon as the military situation permitted was inherent in the agreement.
The Rumanian Delegation appeared to have achieved unity among themselves and expressed the opinion that the Rumanian Government would endeavor loyally to carry out the terms of the armistice. Several members of the delegation expressed the hope that the Allied Control Commission would speedily be set up as they were counting upon the presence of American and British representatives to act as a restraining influence on the Soviets in their application of the armistice terms.
5. The character of the negotiations and the attitude of the Soviet Delegation, as expressed in our numerous conferences among ourselves and with the Rumanians, has given some light on the possible future state of affairs in Rumania.
Although Rumanian armed forces will presumably fight side by side with the Red Army as envisaged in the armistice agreement, they will have to submit to the Red Army domination and probably to the education of their troops in the Soviet methods to no less degree than the Polish and Czech forces operating with the Red Army.
The terms of the armistice give the Soviet Command unlimited control of Rumania’s economic life; and the reduction of the Rumanian standard of living more to that of the Soviet Union may be expected gradually to take place.
Politically, the clauses about organizations hostile to the Soviet Union and about control of activities influencing public opinion can be depended upon to assure the Soviet High Command due police [Page 237] power for the period of the armistice. No chief of police or interior authority will be tolerated who does not make himself amenable to Russian policies. In addition to this, Russian authorities will take a direct hand in the administration of police measures considered necessary for the full protection of Soviet interests. There need be no fear that Axis influence will not be eliminated from Rumanian political life. But the extent to which other political groupings are able to make their influence felt will depend, to quote a common Moscow phrase, on the understanding which they show for Russia’s position. This morning’s Moscow press already tells of the emergence of a new political grouping, the policies of which are apparently acceptable to Moscow in the same way as those of the Polish Committee of Liberation and the new regime in Bulgaria.
It is still difficult to predict the part our own representatives will be able to play in Rumania during the armistice period. The original Russian conception seems to have been that the functions of our representatives on the Control Commission would be limited strictly to those of liaison between our Government and the Soviet command. In this case, information concerning the control activities of the Soviet command would be released to our representatives if and when such release had been considered and approved by competent Soviet authorities, and it is not to be taken for granted that our representatives would be able to deal directly with Rumanian Government officials. The British are now challenging this conception energetically and are demanding that their representatives on the control commission should have direct contact with the Rumanian Government. Otherwise they ask to be further represented by a political mission, as had been agreed with Molotov at the time when the April terms were under discussion.
However this question is decided, much of the efficacy of our officials in Rumania will depend on the extent to which they are permitted by Rumanian and Russian police authorities to associate privately with Rumanian officials and Rumanian citizens, and to participate generally in the life of the community.