Office of the Historian

740.0011 EW (Peace)/3–2744

Memorandum by Mr. Cloyce Kenneth Huston of the Division of Southern European Affairs

[Washington,] April 11, 1944.

We must bear in mind the following points in connection with the Russian armistice terms for Rumania:

1.
Since the terms constitute a definite departure from the principle of unconditional surrender,57 it will be important for the purposes of prestige and psychological warfare to protect ourselves as far as possible from charges of having deserted this loudly announced principle.
2.
The terms are essentially Russian, not allied nor tri-partite; they are frankly based on the practical premise that the war with Rumania is Russia’s own business. We have heretofore proceeded on the assumption that the surrender terms would be worked out jointly in the European Advisory Commission in London and the American representative of that body has been provided with an American draft of proposed terms for Rumania.
3.
The Russian proposals differ drastically from those prepared in the Department, worked over in the Working Security Committee and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for submission to the European Advisory Commission.58 For example: The American draft was based on the principle of unconditional surrender, envisaged military occupation and carried detailed provisions regarding occupational organs, demobilization, disarmament, communications facilities, war criminals, repeal of discriminatory legislation et cetera, et cetera.
4.
The Russian terms are at variance with the American view on territorial questions:
(a)
whereas the Soviet Government is acting on the assumption that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina lie within the Soviet state frontiers, we have entertained the view that the status of [Page 173] Bessarabia is at least open to question and that the basis of the Russian claim to Northern Bukovina is still more dubious.
(b)
whereas the Russians are prepared to support the Rumanian claims to “the whole of Transylvania or the great part thereof”, our position has been that, although there is no disposition to consider the line established by the Vienna Award of 194059 as being satisfactory or definitive, the whole complex Transylvanian problem should be left for postwar consideration.
5.
Whereas we recognize the desirability of utilizing the Rumanian forces in the prosecution of the war against the Germans, as well as against the Hungarians as long as they are fighting with and for the Germans, we feel it desirable to keep in mind the disadvantages of allowing Rumanian troops to operate or to serve as occupying forces in Hungarian and disputed Transylvanian territory.

The foregoing considerations are not intended to combat our present disposition to endorse the Russian terms, but it may be well to keep them in mind.

Addendum: 6. The Russian proposals place no term on the authority of the Antonescu regime, thus leaving open the question of whether we are to deal and collaborate with a government hitherto responsible for conducting war against the Allies alongside the Germans.

  1. See vol. i, pp. 484 ff.↩
  2. See extract of letter of February 2 from the Director of the Office of European Affairs to London, p. 136.↩
  3. See footnote 54, p. 170.↩