740.00119 European War 1939/2398a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo

18 Yugos. The course of the conversations on the matter of the Rumanian surrender has demonstrated that the rapid march of events requires certain decisions of primary military importance which cannot be delayed for detailed consultation between the three Allied Governments. You have handled these Rumanian conversations in full accord with the Department’s ideas, and the following observations are intended for your guidance as confidential background information:

The American military authorities expect that in working on political arrangements for detaching the satellites from the Axis we shall keep in mind the following military considerations:

Prompt results are of the greatest importance because of the rapid evolution of events; political considerations should therefore be examined with particular attention to the degree to which they might be restrictive of military effectiveness;
In making political arrangements, which obviously should be acceptable to the Russians, particular care should be taken to ensure that such arrangements will not in any way prejudice the present full scale Russian military effort;
The United States will not in the near future be in a position to furnish military assistance in that area, except by limited support of guerrilla operations by air or possibly limited bombing.

The cogency of these considerations is apparent. In the field of political arrangements there may therefore be a recurrent difficulty in adjusting, within the framework of joint agreements, the necessity of primary action by one or two of the three Allied Governments.

It may be that a solution could be found in arrangements analogous to the situation in Italy, where the Russians were consulted in advance as to the armistice, and, while not participating in the operations, are represented on the Advisory Council and the Control Commission. No specific plans applicable to the satellite states have as yet been agreed to by the three Governments. We have tried, however, to get action on this matter, and a series of documents setting forth the American views on terms of surrender of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria have been for some time in the hands of the American representative on the European Advisory Commission at London.44 These documents provide for the general interests of the United Nations, even though the surrender may be effected and the occupation administered by military forces of only one or more of the countries interested. It is also our view that proper consideration should be given to the particular interests of those of the smaller United Nations adjacent to or otherwise immediately concerned with the respective enemy state.

The European Advisory Commission was established in order to provide effective and regular means of consultation and joint agreement in the settlement of general questions. The proposals which we submit to the Commission demonstrate moreover that we desire, as regards each enemy state, to give practical effect to this principle before important political decisions of a unilateral nature foreclose the opportunity.

The Department hopes that with these observations in mind you will report such developments in the present conversations or other intercourse with Allied representatives as may be helpful in finding means for the practical implementation of this policy.

  1. For correspondence on the European Advisory Commission, see vol. i, pp. 1 ff. For terms of surrender for Rumania, see letter of February 2 from the Director of the Office of European Affairs to London, ante, p. 136. For terms for Hungary, see instruction 4433 of August 15 to London and telegram 40, January 4, 1945, 6 p.m., from Moscow, vol. iii, pp. 883 and 956, respectively. For terms for Bulgaria, see telegram 1666, March 4, midnight, to London, ibid., p. 308.