860H.85/12–2044: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State
[Received December 21—7:48 p.m.]
1850. Reference my 1805, December 18, 11 a.m.22 Field Marshal Alexander has received a message from Maclean stating that he asked Tito on December 16 whether he had come to any further conclusions with regard to draft relief agreement. Tito expressed considerable distaste for entire matter and said he had decided that the Allies were not being serious. Maclean stated that he strongly denied this and pointed out there were bound to be misunderstandings so long as whole question of relief was not regulated by an agreement embodying certain principles and conditions the Allies are bound to observe. Tito’s reply accused Allies of trying to impose form of administrative control that infringed Yugoslav sovereignty. Maclean then presented a translation of draft agreement23 which Tito apparently had never seen and pointed out that only item which might be objectionable was paragraph 9 providing for Allied observers and advisers. Maclean stressed the ridiculous situation of Tito’s people starving while supplies lay idle in Italy pending settlement of such a small point as this, and suggested to Tito that if his attitude of wishing to avoid accepting relief from Americans and British was due to political reasons he should say so.
Tito insisted there was no need for observers, that Partisans were distributing food and relief to opponents and supporters alike. Maclean suggested that if this were true Tito should have no objections to observers who might even help to dispel rumors that Tito was trying to impose a Communist regime by force.
[Page 1442]Tito again objected to an unlimited number of observers as an uncontrollable swarm of foreign bureaucrats. Maclean corrected this description of Allied officers in question, whose only wish was to be of help, and advised Tito to overcome his distrust of Allied motives. Maclean reiterated that he personally had no authority to negotiate an agreement, but advised Tito that in view of his attitude toward unlimited observers he should submit a counter-proposal to meet this point, such as a fixed number of officers to enter Yugoslavia initially, to be increased as and when necessary by mutual consent.
Tito accepted this idea and after considerable argument fixed an initial number of officers at approximately 100, subject to increase if necessary at a later date. If paragraph 9 could be amended Tito was prepared to sign the agreement without further alteration.
Maclean’s opinion is that full agreement will still be difficult to obtain so long as negotiations are conducted on Tito’s behalf by delegates without any real authority.
If AFHQ considers Tito’s present proposal a sufficient basis for agreement, Maclean asks for authorization:
- 1.
- To request Tito’s confirmation that he is prepared to accept the present draft with the one modification mentioned,
- 2.
- To ask Tito to brief Goranovic24 in this sense, in Maclean’s presence, and
- 3.
- To request that Tito allow Goranovic to accompany Maclean to Caserta to conclude formal agreement on the lines indicated.
Maclean’s message concludes with his observation that only such a general agreement will overcome the questions of principles which temporary measures invariably give rise to.
- Not printed.↩
- Discussions had been underway at Bari since early October between Military Liaison (Yugoslavia) and a delegation from the Yugoslav Committee of National Liberation over the question of civilian relief for Yugoslavia. At length the draft agreement referred to was drawn up and a copy was transmitted to the Department in despatch 929, November 23, 1944, from Caserta (86011.48/11–2344).↩
- Maj. Maksim Goranovich, Chief of the Yugoslav delegation at the Bari talks.↩