860H.48/12–1744: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State
[Received December 18—5:54 a.m.]
1798. Reference my 1792, December 16, 12 p.m.17 Due to continuing impasse with regard to relief supplies for Yugoslavia, Department may wish to give consideration to a course of action in this matter as a measure of self-protection. The Yugoslav people, of course, do not know the issues involved and have no knowledge other than rumors from Partisan sources of negotiations regarding food and relief. The Yugoslav people know that the Allies are providing food in those parts of Italy from which the Germans have been evicted. They also know that certain rehabilitation measures have been taken in Italy, a country which until recently was an enemy of the United Nations. It should perhaps be pointed out that the Dalmatian coast is practically the same distance as Italy from the sources of British and American food and relief and that there are enough Dalmatian ports open for discharging operations to proceed without much difficulty. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the public in Dalmatia and elsewhere in Yugoslavia is convinced that the United States and Great Britain is [are] in a position to supply food and relief at least to the people along the Dalmation coast whereas so far as it is aware, no food or relief is actually coming in. The Yugoslav public can only conclude, therefore, that this is either the fault of Anglo-American authorities or of the Partisans—the de facto Yugoslav authorities.
I hardly need to call the Department’s attention to the fact that were the Yugoslav people to become convinced that the blame for the non-arrival of food and relief could be laid at the door of Anglo-American authorities, great indignation would be aroused against the United States and Great Britain. The Yugoslav people could claim that they deserved better treatment after all the sacrifices they have made in the Allied cause in the last few years. The propaganda line of the Partisan authorities aims at attaching the blame to the United States and Great Britain. Their present campaign together [Page 1438] with the complete silence on the subject imposed by British and American directives is already tending to produce indignation in Yugoslavia against the British and ourselves. Partisan methods of propaganda in this matter even go so far as to exaggerate enormously the amount of Russian aid which has been furnished up to the present time.
It seems reasonable to assume that even if the Yugoslav public should learn that the absence of food and relief was due to the negligence or incorrect attitude of the Partisan authorities, it would be a difficult task to convince it that the withholding of food by the Americans and British was the proper method of forcing the Partisan authorities to toe the line. To explain the American and British position in such a case would be a difficult task since the hungry population of Dalmatia could not be satisfied only by the knowledge that its own authorities were to blame for starvation. The fact remains that the Yugoslav public is aware that in American and British hands lie the means of relief.
From the foregoing, two courses of action seem open to the British and ourselves in the immediate future, (1) Food can be sent into Dalmatia immediately and unconditionally, (2) we can stick to our position vis-à-vis the Partisans maintaining our attitude of withholding supplies pending conclusion of negotiations, however protracted. In the first case, it would be essential for the British and ourselves to insure that the maximum goodwill and benefit should be reached by giving the fullest publicity to the facts that relief has been afforded immediately and unconditionally. In the second place, it would be essential to make available to the Yugoslav public the fullest information regarding the postponement of relief and the reasons for the fact. This may well involve openly placing the blame on Tito and the Partisans in spite of all the consequences which this action may entail.
Insofar as the maintenance of Yugoslav goodwill and pro-British and pro-American feeling is concerned, the first alternative would clearly be the one which would prove most effective, and indeed, is the course which various high ranking military officials at AFHQ would like to see adopted. Personally, however, I resent the tactics of the Yugoslavs in jockeying the Allies into a position where their humanitarian motives are impugned when the fault lies in Tito refusing the safeguards essential to the achievement of those motives and consequently I would deplore any decision on our part which was not based on a realistic appreciation of the actual elements involved, and which led from a subservient condonation of what appears to be Tito’s intransigent attitude. After all we are furnishing the relief we have at great sacrifice and have to consider other areas besides [Page 1439] Yugoslavia. The test therefore of our approach should [be] fundamentally practical from the point of view of the concrete ends to be achieved.
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