860H.01/12–1144: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:27 p.m.]
1696. For Dunn. Reference my 1371 November 18, 2 p.m., 1445, November 22, 1 p.m. and 1519, November 27.2 The incidents under reference are a few of a series which indicate that the time may have arrived when we should carefully reexamine and clarify our position in respect to Yugoslavia. Such events include the series of incidents in Dalmatia between Partisans and forces under SAC’s command, the rigid attitude of Tito’s representatives at the relief talks at Bari including the denial to our military observers of freedom of movement and the insistence that they be in effect under surveillance, the recent appearance of articles unfriendly to the United States in the Belgrade press and the ever mounting evidence that the present ruling group in Yugoslavia means to make use of every opportunity to enhance the prestige of the Soviet Union whilst seeking to discredit the Western Allies. The Soviet attitude in the present discussions of Balkan bomb lines may likewise be relevant.
These developments have not come as a complete surprise, and it would be imprudent not to recognize that they may well reflect deliberate policy, given the nature of the new Yugoslav regime and the source of its principal external support. While it can be argued that many of the current excesses should be ascribed to early revolutionary exuberance and to inexperience we should not close our eyes to potentialities of a revolutionary and authoritarian regime inseparable from one of the most dynamic and courageous of the European resistance movements, supported by a highly political army and an ably-controlled press and propaganda, strong in race consciousness, territorial ambition and suspicion of the western world and led by an able and ambitious leader who has shown a not inconsiderable capacity for cynicism and international blackmail. Nor can we be certain of the oft cited “reasonableness” of a leadership many of whose principal figures are apostles of a faith inspired not least by envy or who have been made vindictive by repression, are schooled in a philosophy of power and largely innocent of the meaning of give and take or of law in the lives of men and nations. Given this background their very asceticism can make these men dangerous.
Moreover, while this area may be geographically remote we cannot wisely be indifferent to events in a country whose fate is bound seriously [Page 1432] to affect the equilibrium of political and moral forces in Europe, particularly after the withdrawal of United States and British forces from southern Europe, both by virtue of its proximity to Italy and the eastern Mediterranean, and by the repercussions its complete absorption in the Kremlin orbit would have as far away as France and Germany. Even were such considerations transmuted through an effective security system we cannot safely assume that the voice of Yugoslavia would be heard independent of power, political implications or tutelage.
We are thus faced with a fait accompli of serious potentialities both for good and evil, brought about not least by the moral and political bankruptcy of previous regimes and hence endowed with a considerable validity in Yugoslav eyes. It would be prudent therefore to give careful consideration to our approach at this crucial time. The most feasible course still open to us may well lie in seeking to hold the Yugoslav rulers to the spirit of the democratic principles they so glibly voice, which doubtless reflect the true aspirations of the great majority of Yugoslavs after the sufferings of the past years, and thus to seek to strengthen congenial and deserving elements whilst maintaining our prestige and integrity.
But we must also bear in mind that our experience thus far indicates that we would be ill advised to press our military or economic aid upon a government which at best shows many symptoms of having been unduly flattered, and even though it accept our proffered assistance may not with any certainty be counted among our friends.
Sent Department, repeated to London for Patterson as 175.
- None printed.↩