711.53/44: Telegram
The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:33 p.m.]
1609. With regard to the question raised in the fourth paragraph of the Department’s 1477, May 25, 10 a.m., as to any substantial reasons to which may be attributed the British apparent volte-face, this telegram crossed our 1605, May 25, 7 p.m., in which we indicated that we, too, were more or less in the dark.
We have nothing substantial to add to what we said in our above telegram, but the following observations are presented for what they may be worth.
In the past when Campbell has encountered complete resistance from Salazar, he has indicated to me in his account of the conversation that “matters are hopeless” or some similar expression. It may be significant that in our talk yesterday, he made no such remark and I am, therefore, left with the feeling that delaying tactics are being interjected to the end that possibly the American Government might be, in the meanwhile, induced to accept a compromise settlement as was the case in Spain.
In addition to this we are coming to the conclusion that the British are accepting Salazar’s own evaluation of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance92 which, as Salazar stated in his speech yesterday (see our 1606, May 25, 11 p.m.91), envisaged Portugal as an independent but not as a subservient ally; and that having “smelled victory” the British are in many cases permitting long-range postwar considerations [Page 120] to direct their present policy, even at the expense of certain immediate objectives. Any action on the part of the American Government seeking to satisfy urgent spot needs would, of course, tend to cut across British policy in this respect.
Sent to Department; repeated to London as 247; to Madrid by courier.