860H.01/8–2144: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Murphy), to the Secretary of State
[Received August 21—9:38 p.m.]
175. From Norden. Yugoslav Prime Minister accompanied by Mr. Stevenson and Minister Kosanovic and Cankar returned to Bari at 10 yesterday morning and left for Gibraltar and London at 1 spending intervening 3 hours at British representatives’ apartment. As, through an oversight, I was not advised of the precise time of their arrival and of their whereabouts, I was able to see the Minister for only a few minutes of uninterrupted conversation. However, Mr. Stevenson showed me a series of telegrams to the Foreign Office which mentioned that communiqués were to be issued today by Subasic and Tito, that Tito had agreed to present to the National Liberation Committee a draft plan for a “single Yugoslav state authority”, that Serb representation had not been settled but that Tito desires to bring out non-Partisan Serbs “who are not compromised with Nedic or Mihailovic”. It is proposed to use a General Ristic who recently left Belgrade and appeared in Partisan territory but has not joined Partisan movement. The telegrams mentioned that Dr. Subasic had been in poor health during last two days of his stay on Vis and had [Page 1400] had heavy going with the Partisans on subject of diplomatic appointments concerning which he was unwilling to make definite commitments at this time. A plan was agreed for amalgamation of Partisan and Royal Yugoslav Air Forces on lines similar to those in effect for the Navy. Stevenson remarked to me that the really important thing was the establishment of a single Yugoslav state authority and that while some civil conflict seemed inevitable it would amount to a minimum in such a case.
I had only 2 or 3 minutes with the Prime Minister who seemed tired and distraught. He informed me that he had had interviews of over an hour each that morning with Adam Pribicebic41 when [whom?] he had asked to submit written proposals, and with Smilianic. He wished the former to contact Topalovic before submitting his offer. Thereafter there would be no objection to the delegations being returned to Serbia. The other Minister[s?] had little to contribute although like the Prime Minister both expressed regret that there had been so little contact with American [officials?] during the last days. Cankar remarked that everything would have been different in such a case but he hedged when I pressed him for his meaning, no doubt because of the presence of his fellow Minister. Kosanovic expressed a desire to be named Ambassador to the United States.
Smilianic informs me that Pribicebic, while he was able to inform the Prime Minister of conditions in Serbia, was unable to secure any concrete assurance other than permission to see Topalovic and to make proposals in writing through British channels. He came away with the impression that the Prime Minister is a man of good will but tied to British policy.
To Smilianic the Prime Minister admitted that the civil war had increased in intensity since he came to power, stated that he would never do anything to harm Serbs but that his position was very difficult and suggested that only the two leaders themselves could bring about a truce.
Neither visitor was shown text of communiqués. General Ristic’s. name is unknown to the Royal Yugoslav officers stationed at Bari nor is it listed in any available political directory.
After the visitors left my British colleagues in Bari expressed considerable optimism concerning the trend of events. The usual thesis concerning the need to go along because of the revolutionary nature of the Partisan movement and differentiation between Nedic and Mihailovic on one part and the Serbian people on the other was made. [Page 1401] It was interesting that Colonel Deakin42 repeatedly spoke of “swamping” the Partisan movement.
The conversations at Bari and Vis were restricted to an Anglo-Yugoslavian basis without American participation and no invitation to participate was extended to us.
Sent Department as 175, repeated London as 30 and Cairo as 28. [Norden.]