Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV

711.60H/33

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Cannon)

[Washington,] May 19, 1944.

The following are suggested as general principles outlining our Yugoslav policy:

General Statement. The disintegration of Yugoslavia at the time of the German invasion brought into relief the same factors which are involved in the internal controversies today, and which in turn must be dealt with in any future solution of the Yugoslav problem. It was the Serbian element which aligned Yugoslavia in resistance to Germany, and among the Serbs there are leaders who take it for granted that the Serbs should dominate the future state. The same reasons why resistance in Croatia was ineffectual in 1941 are hardly submerged in the present guerrilla activity, and will again be operative when the country is again united. The Slovenes, cut off from the Serbs, were helpless against the enemy, and as a weaker people aspiring to equality on a national basis they are likely again to seek an alignment with the dominant element.

As an alternative to this problem of balance of power within Yugoslavia there has been speculation along lines of separatism, with the idea of new looser groupings, such for example, as an eventual union of Serbia and Bulgaria. We think, however, that notwithstanding the bitter factional conflicts which have sharpened the older and fundamental controversies, a united Yugoslavia would offer the best prospects for the security and prosperity of the three national elements, and afford the best means of cooperation with neighboring countries.

With this end in view the following propositions are set down:

1. The United States does not intend to intercede in the internal political affairs of Yugoslavia. We have no special interests to promote, and seek no special privileges. Our interest is in the establishment of a representative government, upon the liberation of the country, according to the freely-expressed desires of the people concerned. We expect such a government to cooperate with neighboring countries, and with us, in a long-range program of general security and prosperity.

2. While we would not undertake to suggest the forms under which the Yugoslav people should organize their political institutions, we are cognizant of the social forces which are at work. We believe that the people of Serbia are just as much interested in democratic reform as are the people of Croatia or the borderland areas, and that no permanent system can be adopted which does not give full weight to the vigor and traditions of both the Serb and the Croat peoples. Thus the Sporazum of 1939,⁸⁸ with all its imperfections, as well as the newer projects of decentralization or federalization should be given enlightened attention as a starting point for rebuilding a common life between the Serbs and Croats, which is, of course, the cardinal issue in the Yugoslav question.

3. We expect the people of Yugoslavia to work for their own liberation, and wish to strengthen the resistance forces in whatever way the military exigencies may permit. We should like to see the leaders within Yugoslavia concentrate on the military tasks ahead, and do not feel that either of the leading resistance groups now operating in the country can lay solid claim to representing, in the political sense, the sentiments of the country as a whole.

4. We are working jointly with Great Britain and the Soviet Union for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of occupied countries. There is not, and will not be, a separate American “policy” which might be appealed to by any Yugoslav group in divergence from the common policy for the prosecution of the war.

5. At the same time we realize that both the Russians and the British may have interests in the Balkan and Mediterranean area which we would prefer not to support. In any event, it is already apparent that the interest of these Governments is being implemented so dynamically that the effect is hardly consistent with our doctrine of non-intervention. It is therefore important that we should maintain independence of action as regards means of obtaining intelligence, military or political, and should decline to become associated with political transactions, purporting to be on a joint basis, in which the undoubted American prestige in Yugoslavia would be exploited and American responsibility engaged, unless we really know what is going on.

6. We have no engagements to King Peter or to any Yugoslav Government beyond those implicit in the relationships normally existing between governments, or gaining particular importance because of joint participation in the war. We would have no difficulty, however, in continuing political and diplomatic relations with a reconstituted Government, even though it may represent quite new elements. To the degree that forces from within the country may be assimilated into the government we hope that genuine efforts would be made to have them representative of the elements having sound claim to speak for the peoples constituting the broad masses of Yugoslavia. Particularly as regards members of the Government who have been residing abroad we feel that insistence on claims to “representative” character because of affiliations with pre-war political parties is bound to involve the Government in useless political controversy.

7. We are realistic enough not to expect unity among Yugoslav elements abroad, but we believe that the representatives of the various factions who seek support in circles close to the Yugoslav Government or Court could profitably be enjoined by the Crown and by the highest authorities of whatever government may be formed, and without discrimination, to abate their mutual antagonisms during the provisional period of government from abroad.

8. Our relations with Ambassador Fotitch are determined by the rules of normal diplomatic usage. We recognize the practical advantages of continuity in the conduct of diplomatic relations, and consider that Governments in exile should, in general, try to avoid frequent changes of personnel. We would deplore a situation whereby an Embassy in Washington might become a political plum with frequent changes according to the conflicting currents in the groups contesting for power in a Government in exile. To attempt to correct a tendency toward “Serbism” in the United States (Mr. Fotitch is frequently accused of responsibility for this) by an appointment to please the Croatian element in this country, would hardly affect the basic problem, and serve chiefly to reverse the antagonisms. Unfortunately most of the “good Yugoslavs” are not trusted by either the Serb or the Croat enthusiasts.

9. We think that the Yugoslav element in the United States will be helpful to the people of Yugoslavia in the difficult days of rehabilitating their country, but that Yugoslav-Americans should not be considered as spokesmen for public opinion in Yugoslavia today.

10. We expect to be called upon for an important contribution for relief purposes and for the reconstruction of Yugoslavia, This will be mainly through international machinery established for that purpose, but we realize that the people of Yugoslavia will look especially to their friends and relatives in this country to help them in the difficult years ahead.

Cavendish W. Cannon

88. The Yugoslav constitutional settlement of 1939, which set up the semi-independent Banovina Croatia. The Ban, or Governor, was given full autonomy in certain specified regional matters.