762.61114/7–1344
The Chargé of the Soviet Union (Kapustin) to the Secretary of State
Washington, July 13,
1944.
My Dear Mr. Secretary: On instructions of the
Soviet Government I have the honor to bring to your attention the
following.
On July 9, 1944 a representative of the staff of General Eisenhower39 has
made at the press conference in London an extremely ambiguous statement
regarding Soviet prisoners of war in the German Army. In this statement,
the text of which I am enclosing herewith, is contained a number of
improbable and evidently fictitious data, concerning Soviet citizens in
military service, drawn, apparently, from German sources.
Arises a lawful question, what common Allied interests could have
prompted such a statement, defaming Soviet people and casting a shade on
Soviet citizens in military service who found themselves in German
captivity?
The Soviet Government considers such a statement of a representative of
the staff of the Supreme Command of the Allied Expeditionary Forces
inadmissible. The Soviet Government hopes that the Government of the
United States will give due consideration to this statement.
Sincerely yours,
[Annex]
Text of Statement
“The Russians are serving in the German Army. Here is a typical
example how the Russian soldiers are forced to join the German
service:
A prisoner of war was a Sergeant in the Red Army. He was taken
prisoner in the Viazma region in 1941. Soon after that he escaped
and
[Page 1242]
in the course of two
years was in the ranks of the Second Partisan Division.
In May, 1943 he was again taken prisoner and sent to Germany. On
November 1, 1943 he was informed that he is a participant of the
“Russian Army of Liberation”,40 and then he was
sent to the coast of the English Channel as a soldier in the
contingent of the Eastern Battalion. In most of the cases the
personnel of these battalions is insufficiently trained to handle
German arms. In one case it was found that Russian machine-gunners
could not take apart and put together again their weapons. German
corporals are treating the Soviet soldiers with contempt and insult
them. The soldiers of the Eastern Battalion have shot some of their
German corporals a few days before the Allied invasion. The Germans
have suffered complete failure in their efforts to impress the
Soviet soldiers with their doctrines with the aid of propaganda and
other measures. The majority of these soldiers have preserved
untouched their moral principles and political views, and they
consider themselves as citizens of the U.S.S.R.
The chief mass of the Russian soldiers in German service, while they
were in the Russian Army fought good but the fact that they have
shown themselves badly in the West, proves their anti-Nazi feelings.
Approximately 10 per cent of the Russians in service of the Germans
may be considered as pro-German and consider that they joined the
German Army at their own free will. In respect to the former
officers of the Red Army, serving now as officers in the German
Army, this percentage should be considered as somewhat higher.
Recently Hitler issued an order, fully equalizing in rights these
officers with the officers of the regular German Army. The staff of
the “Eastern Troops” has worked out a complicated mechanism, the
duties of which are to return dissatisfied Soviet soldiers to the
camps under the control of the SS–troops.41 This return
to camps is considered as an extremely severe punishment, and such
it is. Hunger plays the part of the most important factor for
recruiting of former Soviet soldiers into the “Russian Army of
Liberation” and into a number of other Eastern legions. Mess-halls
in the camps for Soviet prisoners of war have sold to hungry
soldiers human flesh—corpses
[Page 1243]
of dead prisoners. In other camps the
procedure of receipt of food was not quite as good organized and the
prisoners simply were lined up at a corpse of their dead
comrade—prisoner of war—in order to receive their share.
In the beginning of 1942 the Russians, who were willing to go over
into German service, were organized into separate battalions. In the
contingent of these detachments they spent more than two years. At
first these detachments were organized only so as to fight in their
motherland, i.e. the Georgians would have fought on the territory of
Georgia, and the Azerbaidzhanians for Azerbaidzhan. However, these
soldiers went through a number of deportation and training stations
and, finally, were assigned to field detachments at the Eastern
front. In certain cases the field detachments were included in the
contingent of army corps or groupings. The Russian battalions were
used to fight against the guerillas, on communication lines. But
many battalions joined the guerilla detachments. Other battalions
fought together with German detachments at the front line but also
in this case some of them tried to join the Red Army.”
