840.70/12–544: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:52 p.m.]
10751. From EITO Delegation.
I. ReDepts 10087, December 1. Ronald formula was submitted to Continentals without being first submitted to Soviets for the reasons indicated in the Embassy’s 9799, November 10. (See also Department’s 9344, November 8.) We believe the reaction of the Continentals as reported in Embassy’s 10690 of December 2 has shown the desirability of this procedure and that we have avoided the embarrassing position that would have resulted had the Ronald formula first been accepted by the Soviets and later rejected by the Continentals. French were not used as intermediaries because as indicated in Embassy’s 10574,12 they did not wish to serve in that role.
II. With reference to Department’s questions concerning the stopgap arrangement, Embassy’s 1069213 which crossed Department’s 10087, December 1, contained our view that in the light of recent developments, it seemed unlikely that a stop-gap arrangement would be needed.
III. Section IV of this cable is inserted at request of Clay and does not represent the views of Hooker, Moats and Allison with respect to Ronald formula (see section V of this cable for comments on Clay’s remarks about Hondelink proposal). We assume as indicated in Embassy’s 10690 of December 2, section III, that Department is willing to go ahead with EITO with or without Soviet participation, although on a basis that goes as far as possible to make such participation possible on technical grounds. We consider that the opposition of the Continental Allies to the Ronald formula was clearly so pronounced as [Page 898] to show that we would not have been justified in (a) risking the loss of valuable time in attempting to secure Soviet approval to the Ronald formula, as to which the Department expressed fears in its 9344 of November 8, fifth paragraph, (b) only to incur the probability of rejection by the Continentals.
IV. Clay wishes to point out that as reported in part VIII of Embassy’s 10574, November 29, 1944, Ronald formula was acceptable to French; that procedure adopted amounts in effect to an abandonment of Ronald formula, since the purpose thereof was to sidetrack the Polish question and lead the way for the Soviets to sign the agreement, if, after being furnished with the Ronald formula, they approved it. Nothing has occurred to change view of your Delegation stated in first sentence of part II of Embassy’s 9799, November 10, 1944, and he feels that before committing ourselves finally, we should have clearer indication than we have yet had from the Department as to whether Department is prepared to go ahead on an EITO in which the Soviets might not participate, particularly since effectiveness of EITO, as an over-all control over supply of transport equipment, et cetera, might be seriously impaired, if it starts out without full cooperation of Continental Allies subject to Soviet influence, such as the Yugoslavs and Czechs. The British have made clear that they are prepared to go ahead on an EITO without Soviet participation.
Referring to part II, Embassy’s 10690, December 2, 1944, he is advised that at the meeting referred to, the opposition of the Ronald formula was generally from the heads of the same Continental delegations who at the meeting urged the Hondelink proposal, viz, the Dutch and Poles, with some assistance from the Belgians.
Reference Hondelink proposal and supplementing Embassy’s 10690 and 10691, December 3 [2], 1944,14 Clay thinks that it might be helpful to Department to have text of a proposed revision of Article III, section 7, which, prior to distribution to Continental Allies of text of revised agreement and explanatory notes, was handed to Hondelink and placed before other Allied delegations. This read as follows: “The Executive Board shall, subject to confirmation by the Council, appoint a chief executive officer (to be called ‘Director General’) who shall work under the supervision of, and be responsible to the Executive Board. It shall also appoint such other headquarters, regional and local staff as may be necessary, to act under the supervision of the Director General.”
At the time this was satisfactory to Hondelink and Levy, of French Delegation, who advised heads of United Kingdom and United States of America Delegations that they could obtain acceptance of it by smaller Continental Allies. The quoted language is preferable to suggested rewording of first and second paragraphs of Hondelink [Page 899] proposal set out in Embassy’s 10690, December 2, 1944, with possible substitution of “chief executive officer” for “director-general” to meet point discussed in part 3 of Embassy’s 9808, November 10, 1944,15 Clay would like to have this considered on its merits as one of the alternatives to the Hondelink proposal that might be more acceptable to the Soviets than that proposal.
Within time limits permitted, it has not been possible to consult with regard to subject matter of this cablegram, Reed of MEA and Colonel Case, who presumably still entertain views referred to in Embassy’s 10691, December 2, 1944.
V. Hawkins and Penrose have not participated in discussions of Ronald formula, but express their agreement with following comments on Clay’s remarks in section IV of this telegram with respect to Hondelink proposal. Hooker, Moats and Allison feel that Hondelink proposal creates a sound administrative set-up which is favored by the Continental Allies and the United Kingdom and that the earlier proposal would not now be acceptable, and if the earlier proposal be regarded as different only in form it would be pointless to urge it, whereas if it be regarded as different in substance it would be justifiably rejected by the Continental Allies and the United Kingdom and that since the only question before the Department is the acceptability of the Hondelink proposal, any discussions of an earlier proposal, long since superseded by later developments, is not at this time relevant.