840.70/11–1744: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 17—5:20 p.m.]
10071. From EITO Delegation. Ronald just telephoned in haste, prior to leaving the city, to the following effect:
He has consulted with his colleagues in the Foreign Office on the points mentioned in the first paragraph of the Embassy’s 10021 of November 16 and they are considering taking the line indicated below, which, however, we should not take as definitive until they have communicated with us later. They proposed that the British reply to the Soviet note on the Polish issue should be “generally of the same softness” as the proposed United States reply “but would take somewhat different lines determined by what Eden said to Gousev.” It would end with a plea to the Soviets to reconsider their refusal to participate in the Conference with the Polish Government in London somewhat along the lines of the proposed American note. At the time of the delivery of their note to the Soviets, they propose to say they would contrive that there shall be no meeting of the Conference or of the Main Committee, at which the Soviets would be placed in the embarrassing position of being asked to sit with the Polish Government, during a reasonable period which they intend to specify shall not be more than 4 or 5 days. Thereafter they cannot commit themselves not to reconvene the Conference or the Main Committee.
Subject to confirmation to us later as indicated above, they propose to consult with Massigli on the proposed redraft, including the Ronald formula and particularly to ask his views as to how far he thinks it is necessary to go to insure Soviet participation, not only eventually in EITO, but in current deliberations. Ronald did not specify whether he meant formal or informal deliberations, and did not give us an opportunity to inquire. Depending on Massigli’s reactions, they propose to ask him to “try out” the suggested redraft and the Ronald formula on the Continental Allies.
We asked if this meant a definite rejection of the Department’s proposal that all the delegations should be informally notified, prior to delivery of the United States–United Kingdom notes to the Soviet, that informal discussions would be held with a, view to arriving at an acceptable text for the EITO agreement. He said he did not construe the Department’s suggestion as other than a contingent one, and did not make it clear what he considered the contingency to be. At this point he terminated the conversation to catch a train.
[Page 873]Having in mind the sentence in the Department’s 9608 of November 1591 referring to the proposed procedure in event of Soviet obduracy, and having in mind also the British unwillingness to participate with the Soviets in the Interim Commission, reported in our 9978 of November 15, we, early in the conversation, inquired as to the British attitude towards asking the Soviets to participate immediately in some stop-gap arrangement. Ronald replied that they would be willing only to inform the Soviets of any stop-gap arrangement that was worked out and say they would be willing to have Soviet observers sit with the interim body.
It is our opinion that there is no possibility of securing British acceptance of our position on the Interim Commission and therefore if the British proposal of an alternative interim arrangement appears reasonable and workable, we should recommend it to the Department. In this connection we have also been told by Hondelink that the Continental Allies have learned of the Interim Commission proposal and that many of them are unalterably opposed to it.
We feel it might be helpful, after we receive the British alternative proposal to the Interim Commission, if we consider it sufficiently meritorious to recommend to the Department, that we informally advise the Foreign Office that this is what we intend to do, and indicate that in our personal view, and not speaking for the Department we feel it would be much easier for the Department to give any such alternative proposal sympathetic consideration if the British could see their way clear to meeting our views as to (a) full Soviet participation in any interim arrangement, and (b) the desirability of informally advising all the delegations, in advance of delivery of the United States-United Kingdom replies to the Soviets, of our intentions to hold informal discussions. Please advise urgently if we can speak to the Foreign Office along the lines indicated above. [EITO Delegation.]