Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, General: Economic and Social Matters, Volume II

840.70/11–1044: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

London, November 10, 1944—10 p.m.
[Received November 11—11:05 p.m.]

9808. For Berle from EITO Delegation. Following is summary of proposed revision of EITO draft agreement, to which British have agreed and which represents both what we believe we can and should concede to secure agreement with the Soviets and the most we can concede if we are to retain adequate assurance of the organization’s having sufficient power:

(a) We would accept the Soviet amendment to Article I, as contained in EIT/18 (despatch No. 18928).⁸¹

(b) In Article III, section 5, we would agree to a 7-man executive board from the outset, pointing out by way of commentary that under our proposed revision of Article XI (Ronald’s proposal to get around the Polish issue) the total membership of the organization would at first be less than 7, and that one or more places of the board might need to be kept open for later signatories, such as the Czech.

(c) We would retain Article III, section 7 as in printed text,⁸² in accord with Soviet view, and explain to Continental Allies that our agreement to a 7–man executive board gives the board power to create a director general if it wishes. They are aware from our statements during the debates of our support for the creation of that office, on the ground that we regard it as administratively desirable. Clay agrees that it is administratively desirable for the board to have a chief executive officer but thinks that it is not important that the chief executive officer have the title Director General and, in any event, because of ideological connotations that the Soviets attach to that title, controversy over this question should be avoided for the reason it may prejudice our receiving from the Soviets a favorable response to the redrafted EITO agreement. He further feels that as a matter of principle, the executive board should have some discretion in arranging the details of the organization of EITO’s organization or in modifying them to meet any exigencies which may arise and which cannot be foreseen in advance.

(d) We would accept the Soviet text as in EIT/18, adding the words “without the unanimous consent of the Council” and retaining the second paragraph as in the printed text.

(e) We would accept the Soviet preamble to Article VII, as in EIT/18.

(f) We would accept the Soviet text of Article VII, section 1 as in EIT/18.

(g) Coming to section 2 of Article VII, this ties in with section 4 of Article VIII, which is the subject matter of Department’s 9345 and 9346 of November 8.

“The organization shall assist the realization of requirements of member governments for transport equipment and material.

“The organization shall, within the framework of the priorities determined by the appropriate authorities of the United Nations, allocate to member governments in Continental Europe, on such conditions as it may deem necessary, such transport equipment and material as may be made available to it for this purpose by the Allied Commanders-in-Chief, by occupation authorities, or by agencies of any one or more of the United Nations.

“To enable the organization to carry out this obligation effectively, it may consult with member governments on their export and import possibilities and needs in respect of Continental Europe and shall receive from such member governments notification of all arrangements made in respect thereto.”

But the purpose of the original section 2, Article VII and the corresponding section 4 of Article VIII in the printed text was to make the organization effective in allocating transport equipment to member governments in accordance with their needs. To achieve this purpose the organization was given the absolute power of allocating transport equipment from all the enumerated sources and all member governments bound themselves to accept such adjudication. The Soviets have firmly maintained that this violates the principle agreed to in Article I and constitutes a usurpation of national sovereignty. The Czechs informally after Masaryk’s speech pointed out also that it might result in forcing an exporting country to forego orders at better prices and credit risks in favor of poorer prices and risks. The latter objection is a corollary of the failure to accompany the power of allocation with provision for financing the requirements of countries unable to pay for equipment.

The text proposed above obviates both objections and removes the need for section 4, Article VIII, by giving the organization the power of allocation only over equipment which will be made available to it for this purpose and gives it the means of effecting the necessary coordination of the allocation of such material with imports and exports by the right to consult with member governments on their export and import possibilities and needs and receive from them advice of all firm commitments.

We respectfully urge that the Department approve the above text, and the consequent deletion of Article VIII, section 4, instead of the text for the latter section proposed by the Department, for the following reasons:

1. This is the part of the agreement to which the Soviets have made the strongest objection. It provides the basis for their contention that the agreement confers powers that interfere with the sovereignty of the member governments, et cetera.

2. In the form presented to the Conference (i.e., the printed text) it implies controls over our own export trade which might give rise to grave political objections, and which might later become difficult to honor without special legislation.

3. The text suggested by the Department in effect gives the member governments an option whether or not to hold themselves bound that is cast in such general terms as to set an undesirable precedent with respect to section 5 of Article VIII to which we attach primary importance and for which we have framed a considerably stronger form of commitment.

4. The Department’s proposal for amending section 4 of Article VIII does not seem to meet the point raised in our 9364 of October 30 that the power of allocation in Article VII, section 2, is largely meaningless without providing means of financing.

5. The qualified commitment suggested by the Department will come to the same thing in the end as the outright deletion as recommended by us, since in practice none of the governments will consent to be bound unless all are equally bound.

6. We feel there is much more to be gained in securing Soviet approval of the revised draft as a whole by going the entire way to meet their position on this point rather than striving for a form that appears to regain some vestiges of our position although yielding it in substance.

7. Apart from the deletion of section 4 of Article VIII the Soviets seek the deletion of subsections (c) and (d) of Article VII, section 2. The Department’s proposal does not meet this point, while ours does.

(h) Article VIII, sections 1 and 2, are with minor changes the same as proposed by the Soviets in EIT/18.

(i) Article VIII, section 4 is deleted, as discussed under (g) hereof.

(j) Article VIII, section 5 and the next unnumbered section of EIT/18 are combined in the following form to give us in slightly different words the substance of Article VIII, section 5 of the printed text.

“Every member government undertakes to ensure by any means in its power the rapid movement of traffic of common concern in accordance with the recommendations made by the organization under section 6 of Article VII.”

The words “by any means in its power” are a concession to the Soviet objections to ironclad forms of commitment. We regard the text as sufficiently strong to save the substance of a valid commitment, but we consider it the farthest limit to which we can go unless we accept an organization that is merely consultative.

(k) The following redraft of Article XI embodies the Ronald formula to get around the Polish question:

• “1. This agreement shall be open for signature at once by the governments referred to in section 5 of Article III and by such other governments of the United Nations in Continental Europe as are the effective authorities for transport in their territories.
• 2. It shall also be open for signature by the government of any other United Nation, the European territory of which has been in the occupation of the enemy, from the date on which the said government resumes, by transfer from the Allied Commander-in-Chief concerned or otherwise, responsibility for civil administration in that territory, or from the date on which the said government becomes the effective authority for transport in that territory, whichever is the earlier date.
• 3. It shall also be open for signature by any other government in Continental Europe upon invitation by the council.
• 4. This agreement shall come into force for each member government on the date of signature. It shall remain in force for two years from the date of the general suspension of hostilities with Germany and shall thereafter remain in force, subject to the right of any member government, after the expiry of 18 months from the date of such general suspension of hostilities, to give 6 months notice in writing to the council of its intention to withdraw from this agreement.
• 5. The organization shall begin to exercise its functions under the provisions of Article VII and Article X in any territory in Continental Europe as soon as the member government concerned becomes the effective authority for transport in that territory, provided that the Allied Commanders-in-Chief concerned are satisfied that military necessity permits, and under such conditions as they may deem necessary.”

No other formula better calculated to make possible an agreement on EITO before the Polish question is settled has been suggested. The practical alternatives seem to be:

(1) To do nothing until a settlement of the Polish question;

(2) To push the Interim Commission instead of EITO, pending settlement of the Polish question;

(3) To push some other arrangement more or less similar to the Interim Commission instead of EITO, pending settlement of the Polish question;

(4) To push both EITO (using Ronald’s formula) and the Interim Commission, as we have recommended;

(5) To push EITO alone, using Ronald’s formula, as the British prefer.

Either of the last two we consider preferable to the first three and we do not know of any other possibilities that would not involve the Polish question directly.

(l) We propose adding a proviso to Article XII that it shall not apply to agreements between member governments to facilitate the working of traffic across international borders. Though irrelevant to the original text of the Article it meets the Soviet objection as we understand it.

There are numerous other drafting and other changes for the sake of clarity and in order to meet points raised by various delegations. We regard none of them as substantial.

A copy of the revised text follows by airmail.⁸³

We believe there will be much to be gained by the promptest possible action. [EITO Delegation.]

Gallman

81. Despatch 18928, October 31, not printed.
82. See text transmitted in despatch 18095, September 19, from London, p. 792.
83. Transmitted to the Department in despatch 19188, November 13; neither printed.