840.50/9–444: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 4—7:05 p.m.]
7216. For Berle, Hooker and Radius. Department’s 7117, September 2, 1944. Department’s amendments to proposed text approved by British. However, as indicated in Embassy’s telegram dated September [Page 784] 2, on reconsidering procedure to be followed in Moscow, British fear that if concurrence of Soviet Government to the texts or its choice of alternative texts is sought, this will result in further delay unless some deadline is put on the time allowed the Soviet Government for consideration. They fear that the danger of delay would be heightened by the proposal of the Department to secure the Soviet Government’s concurrence in the establishment of the Interim Commission by the United States and United Kingdom Governments. As the Soviet Government has not given any indication of its attitude in response to previous communications, they fear that additional weeks might pass while we were waiting for an expression of attitude with respect to the Interim Commission and they proposed that the United States and United Kingdom Governments proceed with its establishment if an immediate expression of opinion is not forthcoming from the USSR Government. They suggest that the Soviet Government’s attitude might be learned and delay avoided by asking the British Ambassador in Moscow to follow the procedure indicated in the telegram quoted below. According to this procedure, only one draft of the communication to the Allies would be shown the Soviet Government initially, that previously referred to as “Draft B” into which would be incorporated the Department’s first alternative addition to paragraph 7: “The Government of the USSR has agreed in principle to the establishment of the Interim Commission and initially will appoint an observer to the Interim Commission.” The Soviet Government would be asked to indicate by September 9 whether it concurred in the references to its position in the draft communication. If it should give no indication, the references would be removed and the communication would be sent to the Allies without reference to the USSR. Should the USSR when shown Draft “B” indicate [willingness to join in?] invitation to the Allies, it would be shown what has been known as “Draft A” and asked to express its concurrence in the text.
The following is the proposed text of the telegram to the British Ambassador in Moscow:
“My telegram No. 2701. Although no reply has been received from the Soviet Government, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States feel that they can no longer delay their approach to the European Allies. They have accordingly prepared a draft communication (see text in my telegram No. . .) to the Governments concerned. You will see that this draft contains references to the attitude of the Soviet Government towards the draft agreement and the Interim Commission. If the Soviet Government feel unable to agree to the draft in this form or to indicate such modifications as they desire by September 9th, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom would propose to omit these references from [Page 785] the communication which would then be issued forthwith as so amended.
If, however, you find that the Soviet Government are willing to associate themselves with His Majesty’s Government and the United Stated Government in inviting the other Governments concerned to a conference, you should inquire whether they would agree to the issue of an invitation in the terms of the draft contained in my telegram No. …”
The Department’s instructions at the earliest possible moment would be appreciated.