Office of the Historian

103.9164: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

London, November 9, 1944—7 p.m.
[Received November 10—12:05 p.m.]

9759. To Land from Reed for Morse, Conway and Chubb by Brown and O’Boyle.

1.
Reurtel 9247, October [November] 4, SD 4145. Have discussed further with Weston idea that Allies should contribute a quota of their tonnage for military requirements. He feels that to set aside a quota of each Ally’s tonnage to be utilized for military purposes would run counter to the general UMA concept of all tonnage as a common pool equally available for the common task and might present practical difficulties in administration of the allocation machinery. On this latter point, however, he would be guided by Nicholson and Conway and our allocation experts. He still feels that there is merit in the suggestion reported in our 7790 of September 20 that a portion of the Allied tonnage which is allocated to military service should be contributed without charge. He will bring with him data which might serve as basis for working out the extent of such contributions for initial discussion with you and he suggests that if we both agree that the thought is worth pursuing it should be raised informally first with the Dutch and then with other Allies before being raised formally in UMEB.
2.
Your 9095, October 31, SD 4130. Weston divides this problem into two parts: (1) It is likely that as liberation progresses some coastal tonnage may need to be allocated to the contracting governments and to the French for their own national requirements. He feels that existing machinery of the tripartite committee, MEDBO25 et cetera, would be the most effective way of exercising the necessary general supervision over the use of these vessels. (2) The Norwegians cannot terminate any of their charters prior to the end of the German [Page 728] war and the Dutch can only terminate Jay charters. Weston feels that the very tight port situation in northwest Europe which is likely to continue makes it necessary to maintain the strictest control over all ocean-going tonnage. Difficulties are already arising as Allies endeavor to get shipping for cargoes in addition to those included in the military programs. These considerations outweigh in his mind the advantages which he saw at first in the possibilities that the early establishment of UMEB might permit the release to the Allies of a good many ships now under charter. Moreover, it would be difficult to see just how the allocation machinery would work if only a small number of ships whose charters had been denounced were involved.
3.
A quite different situation would be presented if Sweden should accede and the Baltic should open. There would then be a substantial volume of tonnage with which the allocation machinery of UMEB could work and it might be very desirable to put this machinery into immediate operation.
4.
We gathered that the Ministry now feels that freight rate committees should begin to function at an early date. Brown and Weston meeting Carlsson and Samuelson today. Will report. [Reed.]
Gallman
  1. Mediterranean Board.↩