800.796/11–2344
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Achilles)
Mr. Harry Hopkins this morning requested Lord Halifax to emphasize to Lord Swinton the importance of reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement at the Aviation Conference. Lord Halifax said that Mr. Magowan, who is both a member of the British Delegation and of the Ambassador’s staff, was on his way back to Washington by plane and Lord Halifax wished to talk with him first. He suggested that Mr. Hopkins might wish to talk to Mr. Magowan. Mr. Hopkins suggested that Mr. Magowan talk first with the Department.
This afternoon Lord Halifax telephoned Mr. Hopkins that Mr. Magowan did not feel he could take the initiative in talking to anyone here as it would be improper for a member of the British Delegation to go behind Mr. Berle’s back and attempt to influence our thinking. Mr. Hopkins accordingly suggested that the Department call in Mr. Wright for information as to the British position as explained by Mr. Magowan.
Mr. Wright called late in the afternoon at my request and we held a rather pointless discussion for an hour and a half. Mr. Wright [Page 589] attempted to make clear to me the British position, about which he knew very little. I attempted to make clear the American position, about which I knew just as little. I emphasized to him the feeling of our delegation that Lord Swinton was prevented by his instructions from even exploring possibilities of a compromise, the importance which we attach to having Lord Swinton given more latitude, and the importance which the President attached to reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement. Mr. Wright emphasized that Lord Swinton had sufficient latitude to listen to any concrete proposals our delegation wished to make. I said that as far as I knew our delegation did not expect to make any new proposals, that it has made its proposal, as had the British, and that in an attempt to compromise we had accepted the Canadian Escalator Clause but could not accept the interpretation which the British put upon it, namely that the Clause should only apply to traffic between terminal points of each route. British opposition to this interpretation, as explained by Mr. Wright, was that to base escalation upon traffic between two intermediate points would permit a Nation not only to run long distance services but to dominate local traffic between intermediate points.