800.796/9–1444
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)
| Participants: | Norwegian Counselor, Mr. Lars J. Jorstad; |
| Norwegian Assistant Air Attaché, Captain Morten Krog; | |
| Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr. |
The Norwegian Counselor of Embassy came in with his Air Attaché to ask whether I could give him further background on the proposed international aviation conference. I told him that a copy of the invitation had been sent to his Embassy as well as to the Norwegian Government in London, and I gave him a copy of the press release quoting the invitation. I told him that, as we saw it, the work of the conference really would divide into three main heads:
- (1)
- The work of reaching provisional agreement so that air services could be inaugurated promptly on the collapse of Germany, in an amicable manner. This would mean agreeing on provisional routes and landing rights and corresponding transit rights.
- (2)
- The work of agreeing on general principles which might govern:
- (a)
- The drafting of an air navigation agreement; and
- (b)
- The setting up of any international civil air organization which might be agreed upon.
- The principles agreed upon at the conference should serve as the terms of reference to an interim council or committee which should be set up for continuing consultation during the transition period.
- (3)
- Agreement by the conference on principles with regard to cooperation in technical matters, such as aids to navigation, quarantine, customs regulations, and so forth, in respect of which uniform arrangements were either absolutely necessary (e.g., landing signals) or highly desirable for convenience and speed (e.g., quarantine). The work of drafting this would likewise be left to the interim council or committee.
Finally, I said that the interim council or committee could be charged with the duty of continuing to gather facts and report regularly to the constituted governments during the transition period, and might be used for consultative purposes to handle problems during this period. I stressed the fact that one of our difficulties in this field was absence of experience, since prewar experience plainly was no guide to air commerce in the postwar era.
The Counselor asked whether this canceled a tentative plan which had been suggested to him for an intermediate conference of twelve or fifteen nations principally interested in air. I said that it did. A suggestion for an intermediate conference had proceeded from the British; but when we undertook to work it out we found that [Page 540] so many people would have to be included, particularly if routes were to be opened in Europe, that it was no more difficult to hold a general world conference.
The Air Attaché said that he thought the general plan we had worked out was entirely logical. They had been doing some thinking about it and had come to about the same conclusions, and that his Government was glad we were getting started. He asked whether we would be prepared to discuss North Atlantic routes at the conference. I said I did not see how the question could be left out.
The Counselor asked whether this would be primarily technical or whether it would also be political—this for guidance in making up a delegation. I said that each government would naturally want to provide for handling the interests it considered most important; as we saw it here, the problem was partly technical and commercial, but it would also include certain major questions of political relationship. This, at least, was the position taken by a number of countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain.
The Counselor then asked whether any international air organization which might be worked out was to be related to the security organization being worked out at Dumbarton Oaks. I said it was a little premature to ask that question, until the Dumbarton Oaks agreements were concluded. As I saw it, we had to work out an air organization which could sit on its own bottom in any event; but I thought it might very well become logical to arrange for its relation to over-all world organization as and when that should take form. The problem obviously could not be solved now.
We had some general discussion about whether a world authority, if formed, should have regulatory powers in its own right, or whether it should be consultative. I gathered the Norwegian Government favored the latter. I told them this was the position we had taken and so also had the Soviet Union.