Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, General: Economic and Social Matters, Volume II

800.796/6–1044

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[Washington,] June 10, 1944.

Participants:	The President
	Senator Bennett Champ Clark
	Mr. L. Welch Pogue, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board
	Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr.

The President asked Senator Clark, Mr. Pogue, and myself to meet him at the White House at 12:30 on June 9, which we did. After some general conversation largely relating to political conditions, the President raised the question of aviation policy. He said that, while he had to go on the theory that the war would go on for some time, there was always the possibility that Germany might collapse, though there were no present signs of that. In such case, we should need to have our aviation policy not only fixed but in such shape that we could move out at once. The Senate Committee had been working on it now for some time, and the President wanted to know what the prospects were of getting an agreement.

Senator Clark said that the Subcommittee was pretty well divided. They had been held up in their work largely because Senator McCarran had wished to be present but had had to go to Nevada to take care of various matters; had stayed in Nevada a month; had then not attended the Committee hearings when he got back. Meanwhile, he had thrown in his own bill, in advance of any determination by the Senate Committee. Senator Clark said that the first question they had to solve was whether we would proceed on a chosen instrument monopoly theory, or whether we would have the more traditional form of regulated competition. The active members of the Committee, he thought, were favorable to the chosen instrument theory, though Brewster only had committed himself. The other members, Mead, Caraway, and Burton, had not indicated a position. Bailey, he thought, favored the chosen instrument, though Bailey had been very judicial throughout. Senator Clark said that he himself wanted to follow whatever policy the President decided. Generally speaking, he did not favor the chosen instrument.

The President said that he himself had rather felt that the best policy was to have chosen instruments in particular fields; while he knew that Trippe was not favorable to this, he did not think that anyone other than Trippe could possibly be successful in running a worldwide system. For that and other reasons, the President favored different lines assigned to different routes and zones. Senator Clark seemed generally to agree.

Senator Clark likewise brought up the question as to whether steamship lines should have the right to own aviation lines. He personally did not like the idea. The President did not take a clear line on this point. Senator Clark reviewed the arguments pro and con on both the chosen instrument and the railroad and steamship ownership points.

The President said that unhappily he might be in the position of not being able to let the matter rock along but would have to move out—depending on military considerations. I said that this was not merely a question of the collapse of Germany. Areas were opening up now—for instance, Africa—in which other countries were moving out, and where we would have to do the same.

Senator Clark indicated pretty clearly that he did not think there would be any really clear-cut statement of view for some time, since he thought the various interests involved would make a controversy whichever way it was settled. I asked whether it could be understood that if we did have to move by reason of circumstances, this would not be regarded as an infringement on the prerogatives of the Senate. Senator Clark said that he thought obviously we would have to protect the interests of the country in the meantime.

From the discussion the following facts became clear:

(1) Senator Clark personally will follow the President’s line; he does not know whether he can carry the Subcommittee, though he will have a substantial group in it.

(2) He recognizes the necessity of getting into action during the summer; believes that Brewster and the Pan American interests will raise a row in any event unless they get what they want.

The President said that he had discussed this matter a little with Stalin at Tehran in the general sense that Soviet planes desiring to fly over American territory ought to have the right to land and refuel, though not to take on and discharge passengers or cargo; we would want equivalent rights in the Soviet Union. Stalin thought something could be worked out.²⁹

In respect of Hawaii, the President said that the right to land and refuel ought not to be had at Honolulu. There were plenty of other points, especially on the Island of Hawaii itself, which could be made available for these landings. He noted that General Arnold thought there should be at least three lines across the Pacific Ocean for safety reasons.

A. A. B[erle], Jr.

29. There appears to be no direct reference to such a discussion in the available records of the Tehran Conference. See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 880.