Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, General: Economic and Social Matters, Volume II

800.796/816: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State

London, May 15, 1944—5 p.m.
[Received 10:42 p.m.]

3929. With reference to the Embassy’s telegram No. 3922 of May 15,¹⁰ we believe it advisable to telegraph a summary and extension of Embassy’s despatch No. 15611 of May 12, 1944,¹¹ commenting on recent debates in the House of Lords on British civil aviation, and enclosing the full text of them.

Informed aviation circles here have expressed privately doubts as to the complete accuracy of Beaverbrook’s statements with respect to the conversations with the United States. They simply do not believe that the United States would agree to make available transport aircraft to Great Britain and still permit Great Britain to exclude United States air traffic from British territory—whether on an innocent passage or commercial traffic basis, through the operation of an international control authority. In other words, they do not believe that the United States would ever make an arrangement at an international conference or at private talks with any nation whereby it permitted Britain to overcome its very important weakness in transport aircraft without pretty definite assurances that the United States could fly with traffic, to, through and over Great Britain (except cabotage). Some of these persons have asked the Embassy whether we thought Beaverbrook’s statement would cause an unfavorable impression in the United States, particularly in the Senate. We said that we did think so. Some of the persons concerned with aviation here have expressed the fear that this impression if uncorrected would be so unfavorable that the possibility of coming to a satisfactory arrangement with the United States might be hurt.

We wish to put every possible emphasis on the importance of our air transport equipment position not only with respect to Great Britain but with respect to the occupied countries and the neutrals. While it might be possible for the British to operate passenger services for a while after the war with converted bombers such as the York, they could not do so on any sort of competitive basis. The occupied countries and the neutrals who have no reasons whatever except absolute necessity for using British makeshift airplanes, look to the United States as the only possible source. As we have reported, the rumors of the Dutch and others ordering British airplanes are completely untrue. The Dutch at least and also the Swedes have asked us whether it is true that we will make aircraft available to the British on the terms indicated in Lord Beaverbrook’s statement. It should be remembered that if the occupied countries and neutrals are allowed to believe that the United States will furnish transport aircraft to the British regardless of what the British do, or specifically under the conditions laid down in Beaverbrook’s statement, they will feel that they too can obtain aircraft from us on the same basis without in any way contributing to the type of air world the United States wants. The more they believe this and the longer they believe this the easier it is for the British Government to influence their thinking; the more difficult it is for us to do so. From here, therefore, it would seem advisable for a spokesman of the Department to make it clear that obviously our supplying of transport aircraft, which we have every reason of doing for a multiplicity of reasons, assumes that Great Britain and the other nations as well, will make completely effective Beaverbrook’s twice repeated, and originally unqualified, statement that Britain has no intention whatever of excluding anyone from British bases regardless of who paid for their construction.

It is for these reasons that from our point of view in London we think it would be a mistake to turn over through Lend-Lease or otherwise, under any circumstances, any civil aircraft newer and larger than DC–3’s, prior to the international conference. It is also for these reasons we were disturbed by the possible implications of Lord Beaverbrook’s letter to Howe referred to in our despatch No. 15627 of May 13.¹²

Bucknell

10. Not printed; it quoted a despatch from a Washington correspondent printed in the London Times of May 15 (800.796/815).
11. Not printed.
12. Despatch 15627 not printed; it transmitted a clipping from the Manchester Guardian of May 13, 1944, quoting part of a letter from Lord Beaverbrook which Mr. Howe had read to the Canadian Parliament on May 11 (800.796/827). For text of the letter, dated April 26, 1944, see Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. 82, No. 57, p. 2879.