800.796/695: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:45 p.m.]
2839. From Berle. A crisis developed in our aviation discussions because of insistence of the British on iron-clad international economic as well as technical control of international aviation. They at first insisted on the Canadian draft (with slight modifications) and after it was clear that from our point of view this granted too wide undefined powers they presented a document which had been drawn up for the Empire Aviation Conference of October 1943.78 This document we agreed could form a basis of discussion and have in it sufficient latitude to permit agreement by the British and the Americans at a subsequent civil aviation conference provided the British [Page 442] did not give to it an extreme rigid interpretation. In dealing with the document Beaverbrook first proposed to interpret it rigidly in the sense of their previous contentions.
At this stage in the conversations (noon April 6) Beaverbrook and I went over to lunch with the Prime Minister. Beaverbrook reported on the general situation and our divergence over the British desire for international control. I pointed out our constitutional and political difficulties. The Prime Minister dealt rather lightly with the whole internationalized thesis saying that he considered the heart of any agreement finally reached would have to be understanding between the British and the United States and he then and there instructed Lord Beaverbrook not to press the extreme position and in any event to arrive at an agreement. My private opinion is that the British never really intended to press for complete international control of aviation but made the contention for the benefit of certain members of the British Cabinet who have taken advanced public positions in favor of internationalism not only in aviation but in general. The Prime Minister added that while he hoped we should find our positions in substantial accord prior to any general civil aviation conference he did not feel that it was necessary or desirable to reach or announce a complete agreement until after the Soviet Union and other countries have made their views known. With this I fully agreed. He said that even if there were complete agreement he would wish not to announce it lest other countries become suspicious.
Actually we then finished our conversations without difficulty and discovered as might have been expected that while the British had asked for a good deal in the way of commercial concessions at our expense they did not press for them; and we thereupon issued to the press a brief statement not repeated here since it has presumably appeared in the American press to the effect that we had agreed to discuss technical subjects informally immediately; that we would welcome Russia and other countries joining us in these discussions; and that there was sufficient general agreement between the two countries to justify the expectation that definitive arrangements would be reached at the international aviation conference. We plan to have a joint press conference Saturday.79 This is at Beaverbrook’s insistence rather than our desire.
I plan to leave England by plane on Sunday, arriving in Washington Monday or Tuesday. [Berle.]