857.48/12–244
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson)
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to Admiral Leahy’s letter of December 2, 1944 expressing the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a proposal of the Swedish Government to forward relief supplies to northern Norway for distribution to Norwegian nationals dislocated [Page 297] by current military operations and to assist in the evacuation of certain of those nationals to Sweden.
Before discussing specifically certain points raised in the letter under reference, I believe that it would be useful to review as briefly as possible some of the developments since the beginning of this year in connection with the question of possible relief programs for the benefit of the civilian populations of Allied countries under enemy occupation.
Early in 1944, for impelling political as well as humanitarian reasons, the Department concluded that a modification in the blockade policy would be most desirable if such action could be taken without adversely affecting the prosecution of the Allied war effort. In Mr. Hull’s letter of January 27, 1944 to Admiral Leahy85 he so expressed himself and asked for the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military aspects of the situation if carefully controlled relief programs should be put into operation in Belgium, France, and possibly Norway.
In Admiral Leahy’s letter of February 28 he stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that no change in substance in the blockade policy should be made at that time but that if supplies could be introduced on a limited scale and distributed without being of assistance to the enemy, and provided that transportation could be made available without detriment to the Allied military effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would interpose no objection from the military standpoint to the introduction of supplies on such a basis.
Accordingly, on March 16, 1944 the Department, after consultation with the Foreign Economic Administration, forwarded to the American Ambassador at London for consideration with the British authorities a proposed plan under which relief operations of this nature might be undertaken. This proposal was first submitted to and approved by the President. A copy of the Department’s communication, airgram 411,86 is enclosed.
Impending military operations on the continent of Europe precluded acceptance of this proposal at that time and for the time being the question was left in abeyance pending the outcome of those operations.
In the Department’s letter of June 10, 1944 this matter was again brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a request for a further expression of views in the light of the military situation then existing. In General Marshall’s letter of July 26 in reply, the position taken in Admiral Leahy’s letter of February 28 was reaffirmed and it was stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be [Page 298] willing to examine from the military viewpoint any specific plan which might be put before them. Prior to the receipt of this letter the Department, on July 1, requested Ambassador Winant at London again to discuss this question with the competent officials of the British Government.87 In that communication it was recommended that a special committee of policy-making officials be constituted in London to give further consideration to this question from the blockade point of view. Toward the end of August the British Government agreed to the formation of such a committee and in a communication dated October 4 the Embassy forwarded to the Department the Committee’s recommendations. A copy of that communication, airgram 1211, is also enclosed.88 The Department subsequently was informed by the Embassy that these recommendations had been submitted to the British War Cabinet where they were receiving consideration. The Department and the Foreign Economic Administration have already indicated to the Embassy at London their approval of these recommendations. The Department has not heretofore forwarded these recommendations for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the belief that to do so prior to British concurrence would be premature.
As regards the specific proposal under reference, the British authorities, proceeding on the generally accepted understanding that the transfer of relief foodstuffs from one point within the blockaded area to another was primarily an economic warfare matter rather than one of particular concern to the military authorities, [and] expressed agreement to the forwarding overland from Sweden to Norway of additional amounts of Swedish foodstuffs in order to assist in this desperate situation. The American Embassy joined with the British authorities in this action. This Department and the Foreign Economic Administration expressed their full approval of the action taken by the Embassy. No position was taken by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare or the American Embassy as regards the movement of a Swedish ship under safe conduct or otherwise between Sweden and Norwegian ports, that being considered a matter completely within the scope of the military authorities.
At this point it might be well to draw attention to the fact that with the approval and under the supervision of the Allied blockade authorities a relief program operating under the responsibility of the Swedish Government has been in operation for over two years in Norway distributing foodstuffs of Swedish origin and medical supplies sent from the United States with blockade clearance. This project is operated to the full satisfaction of the blockade authorities who are convinced that this program has not been of assistance to the enemy and that the supplies distributed in Norway have benefited [Page 299] only the persons for whom intended. That part of the Swedish proposals outlined in telegram 4772, November 21, from the American Legation, Stockholm, which contemplates the shipment of additional supplies from Sweden to Norway is not, therefore, a new proposal but merely a supplementation of the currently operating Swedish relief program in Norway.
The project as it now stands does not envisage the direct shipment from outside the blockade zone to Norway. Compensatory shipments to Sweden, however, to relieve in some measure the increased drain on Swedish resources may be necessary at some later date. In any case there would be no burden placed on Allied shipping since such shipments would be made either in Swedish safe conduct vessels or in the International Red Cross ships now proceeding to Sweden carrying prisoner of war supplies.
In the belief that the views expressed in the letter under reference were arrived at without the benefit of the full and complete background of this matter, I should be grateful if the Joint Chiefs of Staff would again examine this proposal having in mind (a) that as regards the transfer of food from Sweden to Norway the effect will be merely to increase moderately the amount of Swedish foodstuffs which have in the past been sent to Norway for distribution under an arrangement which has been acceptable to the Allied blockade authorities, (b) no shipping used in the Allied war effort is or would be involved, and (c) any relief supplies which may subsequently be sent through the blockade to assist in carrying on this program will not be sent direct to enemy-controlled territory but will be sent in neutral ships to Sweden in compensation for Swedish produce sent to Norway. It is assumed that the position set forth in the letter under reference applies also to the Swedish Government’s proposal to send a Swedish ship from Göteborg to northern Norway to transport food and medical supplies and to assist in the evacuation of women, children, the aged and sick from Norway to Sweden. The above request for re-examination need not include this phase of the proposal. According to a recent telegram from Stockholm, the German authorities have refused the Swedish request for safe conduct. Since the situation has improved somewhat in northern Norway, the Swedish authorities are not disposed to press the matter further at this time.
I should like also to draw your attention to what appears to be a fundamental variance between the letter under reference and previous statements made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject. In view of the conversations which have been held with the British authorities and which, under present instructions, the Embassy at London will continue, it seems urgently necessary that a definite understanding be reached as regards the extent to which the Department may properly [Page 300] commit the Government of the United States in matters of this nature.
As noted above, this Department and the Foreign Economic Administration have long proceeded under the impression that the military authorities need not be consulted in respect of intra-blockade relief shipments provided operational questions did not enter in, e.g. the recent proposal to send via river boats on the Rhine relief shipments from Switzerland to the Netherlands. I suggest the desirability of a statement from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this point.
As regards proposed trans-blockade shipments of relief supplies, this Department and the Foreign Economic Administration have proceeded on the understanding, resulting from the letters from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated February 28 and July 26, that the Department was authorized in principle to commit this Government to carefully safeguarded programs of this nature with the reservation that before being put into effect any proposed programs of this nature should be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval. I should appreciate being informed whether this understanding is in accordance with that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Sincerely yours,