835.00/1714
The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 16.]
Sir: With reference to recent telegrams sent by the Embassy on developments in the Ramírez Government’s policy as they occurred, I have the honor to report that the present prospect for Argentine foreign policy is neutrality and for internal policy paternal dictatorship with clerical influence. The following paragraphs discuss this development and the consequences that may be expected therefrom.
Without entirely ruling out the possibility that Ramírez was insincere in his political negotiations with the Radicals, it appears more likely that he thought he was taking part in a revolution with the two-fold purpose of bringing Argentina into line with the rest of America and of becoming President of the country at the head of a Radical or combined democratic ticket. However, in organizing it he apparently felt impelled to accept the collaboration of the nationalist clique in the Army in order to insure the success of the coup d’état. It is this group which has taken control of the Government and whose domination accounts for the great difference in the Government’s attitude from that first envisaged.
Whether Ramírez is an unwilling prisoner of the Nazi-nationalist group or whether he has been brought to their way of thinking by their arguments remains to be seen. In the meanwhile, recent developments show the Government to be a full military dictatorship characterized by administrative inexperience, bad judgment, and confusion; the anti-Communist shibboleth; hypersensitive feelings regarding the honor and authority of the military; ill-conceived initiative by underlings such as the censoring of President Roosevelt’s speech of July 28;44 religious spirit at times verging on the [Page 452] mystic, as when President Ramírez at the officers’ dinner on July 6 defined the Argentine ideal of happiness as “sufficient food and a good home so children can pray for the country”; antipathy to foreign capital already established in Argentina; isolationist neutrality; and what looks like an incipient attempt to create a “southern American” bloc. Examples have been reported as they occurred.
The basic cause for the change mentioned in the first paragraph is the success of the nationalist, anti-American group of officers and civilians whose feelings, although Mussolini has fallen and the conviction is general that Germany has lost the war, remain blindly pro-totalitarian. The result is receptivity to impressions unfavorable to the United States and the United Nations and imperviousness to the significance of events favorable to the cause for which they are fighting. The favorite themes by which many Argentines have always been easily impressed, such as “Yankee imperialism”, “Yankee pressure”, and “Argentine sovereignty” are urged by the propagandists in El Cabildo, El Pampero, and other publications. The atmosphere, colored by these organs of the press, is receptive to interpretations unfavorable to the democratic cause internally and in foreign relations and in this respect seems worse than it was under the Castillo regime. The Embassy believes that the civilian center of this influence may be a university-graduate organization in this city called the “Club del Plata”.
Radical hopes of collaboration with Ramírez engendered by their conversations with him before the revolution and shortly thereafter are now, according to Ernesto Boatti, who took part in those conversations, indefinitely in abeyance. The Presidency has informed Boatti and José Luis Cantilo, another participant in the conversations, that press of work prevents General Ramírez granting them audiences. Since they had made no specific request for an interview, Boatti says, they interpret this as an intimation that the President is not interested in pursuing conversations at the present time. In the meanwhile, some Radical leaders suspect that the anti-democratic forces mentioned above are attempting to discredit or at least discourage the political parties with the intention of creating a situation which will leave Ramírez no choice but to turn wholeheartedly to them as the only support available to him.
So long as the pro-Nazis and nationalists maintain the upper hand in the Government Argentina must be written off as a loss to Pan Americanism and cooperation with the enemies of Hitler.
The Government is heading for disaster. It is repeating and intensifying the Castillo mistakes, which in their unpopularity with the people made it possible for a handful of the military to effect a successful revolution without any such preparation of the ground as the [Page 453] Uriburu revolutionaries were able to make before acting in 1930.45 The Uriburu attempt to maintain a military dictatorship was frustrated by the determined opposition of a large part of the country despite that government’s initial prestige and popularity and the absence of widespread international disapproval of the dictatorship idea. A similar attempt after thirteen years of rule by the “select minority” and at a time when the great European dictatorships are on the wane will logically meet a similar response. Already it is felt that Ramírez has lost some of the popularity which was manifested toward him during the Ninth of July independence celebration and on other public occasions about the same time, especially among the working classes but also in other strata of society. It is true that the people alone can do nothing against the armed forces but there are signs that the military and naval officers not in sympathy with the clique in power are becoming increasingly alarmed and may be expected to do something drastic to correct the situation when it becomes intolerable enough. Among these are the Justo men, who were probably prepared to resort to revolution to make their chief President had he lived, if legal recourse failed. A number of these are outside the present Government and could form a powerful nucleus around which to build a counter-revolution. Such men as Tonazzi, who has recently been appointed Commander of the Second Army, Giovaneli, the new Director of Army Instruction (or Chief of Higher Military Studies), and Pierrestegui, former Chief of Staff, should not be overlooked in this connection nor should such former Ortiz followers as Colonel Kelso, present Director General of the Remount Service.
The attitude of the American Government in the face of the present situation in this country might well be a mixture of indifference, obviously dictated by the feeling that Argentina’s capacity for good or evil in international affairs is now negligible, and of academic disapproval based purely on Argentina’s failure to live up to its inter-American obligations.… Whatever adverse repercussions the Government might try to foment in retaliation should not deter the American Government from manifesting such an attitude. United States interests encounter their share of criticism here now as it is, in El Cabildo, El Pampero, etc., and private conversations, and so long as the other American countries have no cause to feel the Good Neighbor policy has been violated in anything our Government has done to Argentina a little more ill-nature here should not be feared.
Respectfully yours,
Counselor of Embassy
- The text of this radio broadcast to the Nation appears in the Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1943, p. 57.↩
- For correspondence on the revolution in Argentina in 1930, see Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, pp. 378 ff.↩