710.Consultation (3)A/283
The American Member of the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense (Spaeth) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
Dear Mr. Secretary: In the course of a conversation with Dr. Guani concerning his recent trip we discussed the question of Argentine representation on the Committee for Political Defense. Dr. Guani stated that when the matter was considered in Washington, he had opposed the elimination of Argentina and had been in favor of suggesting to the Argentine government that it appoint a new member of higher “categoría”, but that he now recognized that little or nothing would be accomplished by such a new appointment. He concluded by stating that the action to eliminate Argentina should be taken by the Governing Board of the Pan American Union rather than by the Committee. I explained that the Committee would, of course, not be competent to take such action and that therefore the matter would have to be presented to the Governing Board.
You will recall that on August 1, 1942, shortly after my return to Montevideo, I advised you that President Baldomir40 and Dr. Guani were of the opinion that the Committee could not effectively meet its responsibilities so long as Argentina enjoyed membership, and stated that I agreed with their point of view.41 I am now satisfied that action should be taken to remove Argentina from the Committee at the earliest possible date.
At one time there was some advantage to be gained by continued Argentine participation on the Committee. It was important that [Page 15] Argentina be given an opportunity within the Committee to express its position on the recommendations being prepared on all the principal subjects of Resolution XVII.42 It is also probably true that the publication of the memorandum on espionage activities in Argentina would have been less effective if the action had been taken by an inter-American entity which did not include a member appointed by the government of Argentina. But there do not now appear to be any such “tactical” reasons for continued participation. The Committee has virtually completed its basic studies and recommendations on all of the subjects covered by Resolution XVII. Argentina has had an opportunity to work on the recommendations from their very inception and in almost all instances has taken a position contrary to that recommended by Resolution XVII and to that adopted by the Committee. The “record” has been made, and it is my unqualified opinion, based on my association with the Committee, that there is now no appreciable tactical or other advantage to be gained by continued Argentine representation. On the other hand, I feel that the Committee’s work must inevitably suffer by such representation.
The net effect of the Argentine vote on the Committee over a period of ten months is a repudiation of Resolution XVII. Argentina has in fact accepted Resolution XVII only as it relates to the formation of the Committee, and even as to this there is the recent unfounded allegation of an Argentine reservation regarding the Committee’s powers. It is both practically and legally sound to maintain that a republic which has rejected the core and substance of the recommendations of Resolution XVII should not continue to exercise the privilege of membership on a Committee which is charged with the development of joint programs for the enforcement of the very same recommendations. This position is made even stronger by the fact that the republic in question views its nominee as a delegate charged with the advocacy of national interests rather than as a representative of twenty-one republics.
From time to time during the past two months the Argentine government and the Argentine member on the Committee have acted in a manner which suggested—superficially—the possibility of a change in basic position. In a recent communiqué to the Governors of the Provinces, for example, the Argentine Minister of the Interior made reference to the recommendations of the Regional Conference at Rivera and issued instructions in the very language of one of the recommendations of that conference. Again, on the occasion of the Committee’s approval of the recommendation on censorship, the [Page 16] Argentine member voted affirmatively regarding the censorship of communications with the Axis and that part of the Committee’s recommendation which reasserted Resolution XL of Rio43 and charged that the mere limitation upon the daily number of code words, available to Axis diplomats, is not an adequate defense measure. It is obvious, however, that these occasional encouraging signs of cooperation are mere window dressing; they are an essential part of a policy of petty opportunism which one day encourages the democracies and another day reassures the Axis. The opinion is well founded that the spasmodic pro-Democratic gestures are designed to reassure and thus to mislead the pro-Democratic elements of the Argentine public. Furthermore, under the state of seige it is becoming increasingly difficult to publish the facts which would demonstrate that Argentina is not fulfilling its Hemisphere obligations and by its attitude is in fact doing positive harm to the defense effort. A recent illustration was afforded by the action of the Argentine censor in striking from press reports of your conference of February 11th, that part of your remarks in which you emphasized that twenty American Republics were cooperating effectively in the interests of Hemisphere defense.44 I am satisfied that some such drastic step as the elimination of Argentina from representation on an inter-American body such as the Committee for Political Defense would assist greatly in demonstrating to the Argentine people the seriousness with which the other Republics view the position of their government.
Although the most important aspect of the Argentine attitude is their refusal to break diplomatic relations, to terminate telecommunications with the Axis and to act upon the recommendations which have their origin in Resolution XVII, there are other indications of the true attitude of the present government which should not be overlooked. I have in mind, for example, the first communication which the Committee received from the liaison officer of the Argentine government on the subject of the consultative visits, discussed at some length in my reports to the Department. The Argentine government represented that it had entered a reservation at the time of the organization of the Committee, a reservation which not only affected the Committee’s exercise of power to send representatives to the several governments but which, in its more general aspects, afforded a basis for questioning other powers of the Committee. Our investigations disclosed that as a matter of fact the Argentine government not only did not enter any reservation, but, in writing, had in fact approved the basic statutes of the Committee. The degree of its disrespect and [Page 17] duplicity toward the Committee was then demonstrated by a second letter from Ruiz Guiñazú which invited the Committee to send representatives to Buenos Aires but which made no reference whatsoever to the first letter and its brazen misrepresentation.
Within the past few days another matter has come to my attention which illustrates the tactic which the Argentine Foreign Office is prepared to pursue in order to handicap the Committee and to divide the American Republics. The Brazilian member of the Committee, Pimentel Brandão, advised me early this week that the Argentine Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro had protested to the Brazilian government against the statements made by Pimentel in the course of the Committee meeting on February 2nd when we discussed the first Argentine reply to our proposal for a consultative visit. Pimentel did use “un-diplomatic” language in his sharp criticism of the Argentine position. But the important fact from our standpoint is that the Argentine protest to the Brazilian Foreign Office demonstrates once again the complete disregard by Argentina of the nature and fundamental character of the Committee. It is part of the Argentine tactic, since it has generally served its opportunistic ends, to treat the members of the Committee as “delegates” of the governments which were privileged to nominate them. By so doing, the Argentine government feels that it is able to go behind the “delegate” to protest on a bi-lateral basis to the government which was privileged to nominate him. In this manner, it can use various types of pressure which would not be available if it were to present its protest to the appropriate tribunal, that is, in this instance, the Committee itself or, conceivably, the Governing Board of the Pan American Union. To describe the tactic more bluntly, by disregarding the representative character of the Committee the Argentine government is able to “divide and conquer”; it can approach the several governments individually and in so doing indirectly control the conduct of Committee members. The practice is one which, if tolerated, would jeopardize the effective functioning of any truly international and representative body.45
In their efforts to secure unanimous support for their program of joint defense, the American Republics have done everything that any individual or any nation could properly expect, within a democratic family of nations, to win the full support of the government of Argentina. It has now become clear that that government, as presently constituted, will not change its basic policy. In order, therefore, to protect their joint and common interests the twenty republics can justly maintain that in the management and planning of their joint defense [Page 18] only those republics should be represented which are committed to and are acting upon the fundamental principles and recommendations of the program of joint defense. To do otherwise would jeopardize the defense of twenty republics by granting a directive voice to a nation which is not in sympathy with the basic policy. The voice of Argentina on the Committee for Political Defense has jeopardized and will continue to jeopardize the political defense program to which twenty American republics are committed.
It should be emphasized that a change in the Committee’s membership would not be a resort to a “sanction”. It would merely be responsive to Argentina’s repeated assertions that it cannot accept or act upon the fundamental principles of the Committee’s charter, Resolution XVII. We do not question the sovereign right of Argentina to reject Resolution XVII. On the other hand, we do not believe that Argentina may properly enjoy direct membership on a Committee charged with the implementation of the very principles which her government rejects.
On April 15, 1943, the Committee will have completed the first year of its work. If the recommended action is to be taken, this might be an appropriate effective date for the reorganization of the Committee.
With best regards,
Sincerely yours,
- Gen. Alfredo Baldomir, President of Uruguay, 1938–1942.↩
- For letter of August 1, 1942, from Mr. Spaeth, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. v, p. 87.↩
- Resolution XVII of the final act of the Third Consultative Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Department of State Bulletin, February 7, 1942, p. 128.↩
- This resolution was concerned with the control of telecommunications; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 7, 1942, p. 140.↩
- Remarks made in reply to a question at a press conference of the Under Secretary on February 11, 1943.↩
- Concerning the Department of State viewpoint that the seven members of the Emergency Advisory Committee represented not the individual nations from which they came but all 21 states as a whole, see telegram No. 250, May 7, 1942, 9 p.m., to the Ambassador in Uruguay, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. v, p. 77.↩