Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The American Republics, Volume V

810.5018/150

The Vice Chief of Naval Operations ( Horne ) to the Chairman of the United States Section, Anglo-American Caribbean Commission ( Taussig )

Washington , February 13, 1943.

My Dear Mr. Taussig: At a recent conference on the subject of food supplies in the Caribbean area, you desired that the viewpoint of the Navy in this matter be confirmed.

At present the Axis submarine warfare is not directly affecting the local supply problem in the Caribbean area as it did last summer when the situation became quite acute. It is, nevertheless, understood that local food conditions are none too good in a number of islands throughout the area.

Submarine activity among the islands may be renewed within the course of six weeks or two months. With this in mind, it would be very desirable to increase the supplies of food in that area so that an emergency situation, if it comes, can be handled with supplies on hand.

It is understood that the land-water transportation route across Haiti and Dominica² has been tested to the extent of about 1000 tons, and that it costs approximately $80.00 to $90.00 per ton as compared to $18.00 to $20.00 per ton for direct water transportation. Despite the increased cost it appears desirable to maintain this system as an emergency route. It does not appear necessary to operate the route at maximum capacity but rather to maintain it in a skeletonized status operating at a minimum capacity sufficient to keep the route ready for use. In this connection it is understood that the route at best could only supply a portion of the needs of Puerto Rico. Also to maintain the route at any capacity before the emergency arrives would wear out trucks, tires and other essential parts.

The following specific recommendations are made:

(a) That each Island produce the maximum amount of food for its own consumption with a view to approaching as far as practicable self-sufficiency.

(b) That reserves of food and other essential supplies should be built up in the Islands where they are to be consumed. These reserves should be built up first in those localities where the population is directly connected with the war effort, second, in those islands which are the more difficult to supply under heavy submarine warfare conditions.

(c) Coordinated planning and operation should be provided to get the best results out of such small vessels, schooners, etc., as may be available for the purpose. Construction of schooners for the purpose, provided it does not interfere with our war procurement, would be very desirable.

(d) The land-water route across Haiti and Dominica should be maintained in a skeleton status operating at a minimum capacity sufficient to keep the route ready for use as an emergency measure.

I would like to take this opportunity to stress my opinion that adequate coordinated planning and operations should be conducted to meet this problem before it again becomes acute.

Sincerely yours,

F. J. Horne

2. In October of 1942 the Public Roads Administration was alloted $500,000 for completion and maintenance of a 235–mile road from Port-au-Prince, Haiti, to San Pedro de Macoris, Dominican Republic, for the purpose of supplying food and other necessities to Puerto Rico and other eastern islands of the Caribbean. For reasons of high transport costs, decreasing submarine activity, and pressure from United States agencies that favored sea over land transport, operations over the still unfinished roadbed were suspended after the hauling of some 100,000 tons of critical supplies.