860H.01/582: Telegram
The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 21—1:42 a.m.]
7. [Yugoslav Series.] I would request the Department to read the following in connection with my Nos. 4, 5, and 6, Yugos[lav] Series.75
The Yugoslav Prime Minister summoned me this morning and requested me to telegraph urgently as follows: He has been informed by the British Ambassador that he may expect shortly joint pressure from the British and American Governments to remove General Mikhailovitch from the Cabinet on the basis of his collaboration with [Page 1032] the Germans. The Ambassador, he said, could show him no proofs of this collaboration but alleged that documents had been secured showing that certain Chetniks were in German pay.
In the Prime Minister’s opinion the results of the removal of Mikhailovitch would be (1) that the Allies would lose the support not only of all the Serbian people but also of all non-Communist Slavs and come into conflict with them; (2) that such people would be driven to side with the Germans and thus the war in the Balkans would not be shortened but lengthened; (3) that the present Yugos[lav] Government would be forced to resign in which eventuality he sees no “decent” government which could take its place and the Allied policy to restore the Yugos[lav] monarchy would be compromised; [(4)] that a scandal would be created and the action widely considered as a betrayal of an ally with unfortunate repercussions in other occupied countries; and finally; (5) that it would be contrary to the Atlantic Charter and amount to delivering an Allied nation into the hands of international Bolshevism.
The Prime Minister requested me to add that he has given the above views to the British Ambassador in a “private conversation” and that the latter promised to bring them immediately to his Government’s attention. He concluded by saying that what he understands from press reports to be the present American attitude, namely, that the United States recognizes the Government of Yugoslavia but will continue to give military support to all elements engaged in fighting the enemy, is acceptable to him but that the present British proposals are fantastic and dangerous in the extreme.
Aside from the question as to whether the British Ambassador has not gone rather far at this juncture in mentioning the United States, the Department may well wish to consider very carefully any proposals involving a change in our attitude at the present time though doubtless a straddling policy covering the military and political situations may be difficult to maintain indefinitely. I believe that the only likely successful way to crystallize the situations in Yugoslavia and Greece as between genuinely patriotic and other elements would be the constitution of an Allied front somewhere in the Balkans but that while this solution is not adopted to take sides between political warring groups within the countries contains very definite possibilities of future embarrassment.
Any official advices or confidential background as to its views which the Department may be able to afford me at this time will be appreciated.