851.01/2062: Telegram
The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 21—1:31 a.m.]
662. From Murphy. Department’s 701, April 13, 7 p.m. It is clearly recognized here that after the bases of argument [agreement] have been accepted by both French factions, further discussions will be required with both the United States and British Governments before they can be accepted as the basis to govern relations with the newly constituted French organization. In fact Macmillan and I have already pointed this out in a purely informal fashion. We had however agreed that it would be undesirable to inject specific reservations at this stage of unilateral action on the part of the French.
As regards the “single legislative structure” referred to in paragraph 1, the full text of the memorandum makes it clear that unity must be founded on the basis of a common legislation and that the only legislation having legal force is legislation enacted prior to June 22, 1940. It is not implied that the organization to be established has legislative functions.
The particular significance attached to Martinique is that the Antilles are the only French territories not under Axis occupation which have not joined either Giraud or de Gaulle and an effort will be made to bring them into line. Special importance is attached to the statement on page 5 of the memorandum to the effect that France will participate in the peace discussion in full possession of the overseas territories held in June 1940.
Giraud’s thought here is that it is essential to eliminate the suspicion in the minds of many Frenchmen that the United States and Britain plan to take its overseas possessions away from France—this idea was fostered by Pétain and Laval8 and even de Gaulle and, of course, by Axis propaganda. Giraud wishes to emphasize that no one is going to deprive France of her possessions during the war and that France will come to the peace table intact (there is an underlying idea that whatever internationalization might be made of Bizerte and Dakar, for example, would be coupled in discussions regarding the internationalization of other points such as Gibraltar and Suez).
In my opinion the other modifications will present little difficulty except possibly as regards the question of national sovereignty and the future role of the French Army in European operations. Although Giraud fully recognizes the importance of postponing the creation of the provisional government, nevertheless, importance is [Page 98] attached to the exercise of French sovereignty over the territories which are administered by French authorities. It would, however, have been more accurate to state in my 549 of April 3 that “the Council will exercise as trustee national sovereignty, et cetera”. According to this conception if French sovereignty exercised through a trusteeship is not recognized in these areas the administration becomes purely dissident and would have no local authority either to speak for the areas under its control or to be regarded as the trustee for French interests.
It is also clear that Giraud contemplates that the French Army will play an important role in the liberation in France. There is a fundamental consideration involved here about which the French are highly sensitive. They point out that if and when Allied forces arrive in France, the responsibility for the maintenance of order should rest with the French command. If the Allied High Command insures order then the military action becomes occupation of the country. If the French Command insures order it is liberation in their opinion. They feel that psychologically this is most important to the French people. This, of course, is based on the assumption that the French Army is what it should be.
I feel that emphasis should be laid on the important distinction which exists between France and Axis countries. If sanctions are to be taken against individuals and punishment meted out, it would seem far better for the future that these penalties be exacted by the French authorities as part of an Allied organization than by British or American authorities. It is presumed that such a policy will be followed in the cases of other countries to be reoccupied such as Belgium, Holland and Norway.
I feel certain from the conversations I had with Giraud and Monnet when Giraud’s declaration was being drafted that the interpretations given here are correct and could be confirmed informally if the Department desires. I suggest that the Department instruct me to discuss this with Giraud and Monnet so that we might have Giraud’s interpretation on record before the arrival of Massigli and de Gaulle. We would thus avoid later risk of a confused interpretation. [Murphy.]
- Pierre Laval, Chief of Government in Vichy, France.↩