811B.01/519
Memorandum by the Chargé in Spain (Beaulac)13
When I discussed Jordana’s telegram to Laurel with the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs14 on October 26, 1943, he endeavored to minimize the importance of the telegram. He spoke with little conviction, however, and finally said that what he had been saying did not mean that he would have sent the telegram himself if he had been Minister for Foreign Affairs. From this statement, from his general attitude during the conversation, and from past experience with him over a period of more than two years, I am entirely confident that the telegram does not meet with his approval.
When I discussed this subject, last night, for the second time, with Señor Suñer, Chief of the Overseas Division of the Foreign Office, he told me that immediately after my conversation with the Undersecretary on October 26th the latter called him in and asked him who had drafted the telegram. The Undersecretary told Señor Suñer that he had not seen the telegram before it went out and expressed strong disapproval of it. Señor Suñer told the Undersecretary that he knew nothing about the telegram, that Señor Doussinague had not consulted him about it. The Undersecretary expressed great surprise to Señor Suñer, first, that the telegram had ever been sent, and second, that Señor Suñer had not been consulted.
On November 3rd I discussed the telegram privately and confidentially with the Foreign Office’s principal legal adviser, Señor José María Trias de Bes, who is the Foreign Office’s legal authority on questions of recognition. He told me he had had nothing to do with the telegram and that the implication conveyed by the telegram did [Page 737] not represent the Foreign Office’s attitude toward the puppet Philippine Republic. He had not been aware at the time that the telegram had been sent. He said he would go into the matter and speak to me confidentially later on.
On November 4th I spoke to Felipe Campuzano, a member of the Foreign Minister’s diplomatic cabinet. I asked him why he had ever let the telegram go out. He said he had not seen the telegram until after it had gone out, and that when he did see it he predicted the results which have followed. He said the diplomatic cabinet had had nothing to do with sending the telegram and was not aware of it until it had gone out.
On November 5th I talked to Tomás Suñer, Chief of the Overseas Section of the Foreign Office, in whose field Philippine matters lie. I told him that I was speaking to him entirely personally and confidentially. I said that I was aware of the extent to which he had influenced Spanish policy with reference to matters involving recognition or non-recognition of certain régimes, and that I could not understand, therefore, why he had allowed the telegram to Laurel to go out.
He said that although Philippine matters were within his jurisdiction he had not been consulted concerning the telegram and had not yet seen the text of it. He said that in as much as I had revealed that I was familiar with his connection with the Foreign Office’s decision not to recognize the Mussolini régime he would tell me frankly and personally that he never would have approved of the Laurel telegram and that it was contrary not only to his own attitude toward the Philippines and toward the Japanese, but also contrary to the Foreign Office’s attitude.
He said that he personally was very put out about the matter because Doussinague, the Political Director, had not consulted him with reference to the telegram. In as much as he had not been consulted, he had kept out of the matter, but it troubled him greatly. Using my personal visit as a pretext, he would discuss the matter with the Undersecretary. It was clear to him that Spain had to do something to overcome the impression which the telegram had given throughout the world.
I saw Señor Trias de Bes on November 6th. He was quite excited and asked that I not reveal that I had discussed this subject with him. He said the whole thing had been a “ligereza” (a thoughtless act) and that I should see the Undersecretary about it.
I did, in fact, see the Undersecretary. I asked him whether there was anything he wished to tell me in the matter. He said that the Minister wanted to resign. He, the Undersecretary, urged that he be permitted to resign instead, or at least that the blame be put on him and he be given some other post.
[Page 738]I said that if anybody had to be sacrificed it should not be the Minister or the Undersecretary. That would be making a bad matter worse, from the Spanish point of view.
He said the Minister had felt obliged to assume responsibility for the telegram, as though he had written it himself.
All the foregoing points to José María Doussinague, Political Director of the Foreign Office, reference to whom was made in the Embassy’s telegram No. 3116, October 26, 4 p.m., as the person responsible for Jordana’s telegram to Laurel. It would appear that in obtaining Jordana’s approval of the telegram, or possibly in sending it without Jordana’s approval, he failed to consult, as he normally should have consulted, the official next below him in charge of Philippine matters.
Doussinague, an old career Spanish diplomat, who was Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs during the Spanish Republic, and has been Chief of Mission in various posts, must have been fully cognizant, probably more so than the Minister, himself, of the interpretation which would be given to the telegram throughout the world.