811B.01/499: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 6—11:53 a.m.]
3249. Your November 3, 10 [7] p.m. I called on the Foreign Minister today at his request. He said he wanted it distinctly understood that in sending his telegram to Laurel he had no intention of recognizing Laurel as head of a Philippine government or of recognizing any Philippine government except that existing before our entry into the war. He had been pressed by Japan to recognize both the Burmese and the Philippine governments. The Japanese Minister1 had called on him and had sent him formal notes. He had presented objections in conversation with the Japanese Minister and the notes remained unanswered.
[Page 728]He reminded me that when he was previously Minister for Foreign Affairs the Japanese had requested that their Legation in Madrid be raised to an Embassy. This request had lately been renewed. He had likewise objected to this and the note on the subject also remained unanswered. Spain did not intend to recognize the new governments in Burma or the Philippines and its attitude derived principally from its great desire to promote better relations with the U.S.
He said he considered his telegram to Laurel a purely personal telegram. He had received a very cordial and supposedly personal telegram from Laurel. On his own initiative and with himself solely responsible he had prepared a reply which he regarded as personal wishing well to the Philippine people but not mentioning the Philippine government or nation. If he had not sent it he felt that Spanish interests in the Philippines which are very numerous and important would seriously suffer.
He said it was his view that the U.S. Government should not misunderstand his telegram and not use it as a pretext for action against Spain. He was greatly troubled in this regard because he had received a telegram from Washington quoting an editorial in the New York Times2 which tied this telegram up with decisions reportedly made in Moscow and recommended a basic change in policy towards Spain.
Cárdenas had given him no assurance that the U.S. Government had not more or less inspired the editorial or that at any rate it would not follow the policy suggested in New York Times. He asked me if I could throw any light on the situation.
I then told him I was not in a position to discuss the Laurel telegram except to say that my Government was very seriously disturbed at this unexpected action of the Spanish Government, an action not only unexpected by us but in our opinion most ill advised. I said I was being kept informed of conversations in Washington between the Spanish Ambassador and officials of the Department.
The Minister then talked excitedly for 10 minutes in Spanish. In summary he said he could not find out from Cárdenas what we wanted and now I had told him I could not give him any information on the subject. He asked me please find out from my Government whether it really supported the New York Times policy or whether it was willing to advance any concrete suggestion as to how the present difficulty might be overcome. What he really wants to know is the attitude of the American Government. He is willing to admit that the press attitude may not be approved by our Government but he would like to know. He fears that following so closely on the Moscow Conference3 [Page 729] this incident may be used as a pretext for our adopting a hostile attitude toward Spain.
I said he would have to expect a big access of critical editorials in the entire American press. He should recall that the information about his telegram had been transmitted in English over the Japanese and German radios. If there was one matter on which American public opinion was perfectly unanimous and very properly irritable, it was about Japan and Japanese relations with the Philippines. To have Tokyo radio and Berlin advertising in English that the Spanish Foreign Minister had sent a sympathetic telegram to the head of the pro-Japanese puppet government of the Philippines was bound to touch off the American press. He must not blame the American press for this but rather blame the justification which had been given by Spain to Japanese and German propaganda.
At that point a messenger brought a telegram from Cárdenas saying that the New York Times had reported that Paris and Budapest radios on October 24 and Berlin radio on October 25 had announced a commercial agreement with the Mussolini government. The New York Times considered that their report was true and that it reinforced its view that the United Nations must break with Spain.
The Minister became very excited and said there had been no such commercial agreement or any discussions concerning a commercial agreement or any other subject. Spain did not recognize nor intend to recognize the Mussolini regime. He had told me that and could not understand why the American press carried stories to the contrary. I said the explanation was simple. The American press could not know the stories were lies. They had been broadcast by Axis radio in English. It was very difficult to get Spain’s story. He must not blame the American press but blame the source of the information and the lack of contradictory information from Spain.
He asked me if I were sure stories regarding his telegram to Laurel and the alleged commercial agreement with the Mussolini government, [were?] from Berlin. I said I had definite confirmation of this. He said it was outrageous.
He then said he thought the real situation was that the Germans, aided by exiled left-wing Spaniards, were doing their utmost to provoke a crisis between Spain and United States. He said he wanted to make a personal appearance [observation?].
Ever since he had become Foreign Minister, in September 1942, he had believed that the best interests in Spain required that Spain associate itself increasingly and as rapidly as possible with the United [Page 730] States and Britain and draw away from Germany. He came into office with that firm conviction. He had labored sincerely and honestly to realize this purpose for a whole year. He had encountered enormous difficulties, at first within the Government itself. He had had to endure constant protests and even threats from the Axis. He felt, however, that he had made progress in important respects. The Blue Division was being withdrawn. The last Spanish soldier will have returned to Spain before the end of the month. There has been a big transformation in the Spanish press, radio and newsreels. I was surely familiar with the great evolution in Spanish opinion, including opinion within the Government itself. I must know that Franco had definitely committed Spain to neutrality and had favored close collaboration with the United States. He would like to remind me that he had arranged for the direct evacuation to North Africa of thousands of French refugees.4
He asked if my Government was going to let a single incident which, while perhaps a mistake, was not ill intentioned and for which he must assume personal responsibility stand in the way of further approximation [sic] between Spain and the United States. If this was our plan, then he would have to consider that his entire conduct of Spanish foreign policy had been a mistake. He would resign and retire, knowing that he was a beaten and defeated man.
If our Government would view this difficulty in its proper proportion, on the other hand, there were a number of important pending questions which already were far advanced toward solutions eminently satisfactory to the United States. He believed they could be settled promptly. He did not want to discuss them now but as soon as he was sure that the United States was not going to change its fundamental policy towards Spain, he would take up these various pending matters and press for early and satisfactory solutions.
He asked rue particularly to convey his thought that we must not allow Japanese and German propaganda to stand in the way of closer approachment [rapprochement?] between Spain and the United States. If we did, we would be serving German interests. I said I would convey this to my Government.
At my request he reiterated his categorical denial that any commercial agreement had been entered into between Spain and the Mussolini government. His pledge that Spain had no intention of entering into any relations with the Mussolini government still stood.
- Yakichiro Suma.↩
- Editorial entitled “Franco Salutes a Puppet,” New York Times, November 4, 1943, p. 22, col. 2.↩
- For correspondence concerning the Tripartite Conference held in Moscow October 18–November 1, 1943, see vol. i, pp. 513 ff.↩
- For correspondence concerning this subject, see vol. i , index entries under Refugees from Europe and the Middle East: Spain.↩