852.6363/846: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 19—11:19 a.m.]
1299. (1) As instructed in Department’s 1082, May 14, 10 a.m., I have informed the Spaniards the Zorroza may not sail. Am I to understand from the penultimate sentence that no tankers will be authorized to load on June 9–20 despite the fact that the products will not arrive until the third quarter?
(2) I am quite alive to the importance and weight of public opinion in a democratic country like ours, but when much of that opinion is so badly misinformed as it is about contemporary Spain I doubt whether in critical war times it should be the main determinant of our Government’s foreign policy. To reduce the petroleum program by over a fourth below what was agreed to, last December, in order to cater to misinformed public opinion is actually an admission that our policy towards Spain has been wrong. Moreover I cannot believe that such reduction will satisfy that section of public opinion which would deprive Spain of any and all petroleum. Nor can I believe that the more enlightened American public opinion regardless of its attitude towards the present Spanish Government, desires to deny to the people of Spain ready access to foodstuffs and other necessities, which must be produced and transported by the aid of petroleum products. The program agreed to, last December for 541,000 tons, representing 60% of requirements, was the result of a careful study of most essential needs, and was not designed to permit, nor has there occurred, a free circulation of motor vehicles. Measuring the results of our policy by economic warfare benefits and progressive improvements in the political and military fields, I cannot conclude that it has been wrong.
3. The supply of sufficient petroleum for vital economic needs has been the keystone of the entire economic warfare program in this strategic peninsula, not alone for ourselves but also for the British. To weaken that keystone weakens the whole structure which is giving us blockade controls and economic and political benefits.
4. The success of our general economic program has been rendered possible only because the position of friendly elements in the Spanish Government has been strengthened by our ability and willingness of [to] carry out our supply program, permitting such elements to justify favoring us over the opposition of energetic pro-Axis elements. Conversely the latter have lost ground by reason of failures and reductions in German supply. Our accomplishments have been noteworthy. There are fewer limitations affecting the purchase and export of strategic materials by the Allies than by the Germans. [Page 689] It should be remembered, moreover, that in this totalitarian country where the policy of fixed prices and quotas is widely employed, we have been permitted to utilize the value of our resources against the Axis in open competition, in marked contrast to the situation in Portugal, where preclusive operations have been gravely handicapped by the allocations of strategic materials between the opposing belligerents.40 We have acquired 100 percent of the Spanish strontium output, 90 percent of the fluorspar output and we are now obtaining 75 percent of the wolfram produced.41 Last winter we upset German purchases of greatly needed woolen goods and made skins so costly as to reduce German acquisitions. Our oil program is basic to our success.
5. The above benefits are here viewed primarily from the American standpoint and do not give consideration to the importance of the supplies and other advantages obtained by Great Britain.
6. I am not unmindful that we may desire to use the petroleum weapon in order to gain additional benefits from the Spanish Government, or to precipitate a crisis with it, and I do not counsel a rigid adherence to pre-determined figures in such circumstances. But I earnestly urge that we do not injudiciously weaken our petroleum weapon unless thereby we can benefit.